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Entity authentication is one of the most fundamental problems in computer
security. Implementation of any authentication protocol requires the solution of sev-
eral sub-problems, such as the problems regarding secret sharing, key generation,
key storage and key verification. With the advent of the Internet-of-Things(IoT),
authentication becomes a pivotal concern in the security of IoT systems. Inter-
connected components of IoT devices normally contains sensors, actuators, relays,
and processing and control equipment that are designed with the limited budget on
power, cost and area. As a result, incorporating security protocols in such resource
constrained IoT components can be rather challenging. To address this issue, in this
dissertation, we design and develop hardware oriented lightweight protocols for the
authentication of users, devices and data. These protocols utilize physical properties
of memory components, computing units, and hardware clocks on the IoT device.
Recent works on device authentication using physically uncloneable functions
can render the problem of entity authentication and verification based on the hard-
ware properties tractable. Our studies reveal that non-linear characteristics of re-
sistive memories can be useful in solving several problems regarding authentication.
Therefore, in this dissertation, first we explore the ideas of secret sharing using
threshold circuits and non-volatile memory components. Inspired by the concepts
of visual cryptography, we identify the promises of resistive memory based circuits in
lightweight secret sharing and multi-user authentication. Furthermore, the additive
and monotonic properties of non-volatile memory components can be useful in ad-
dressing the challenges of key storage. Overall, in the first part of this dissertation,
we present our research on design of low-cost, non-crypto based user authentication
schemes using physical properties of a resistive memory based system.
In the second part of the dissertation, we demonstrate that in computational
units, the emerging voltage over-scaling (VOS)-based computing leaves a process
variation dependent error signature in the approximate results. Current research
works in VOS focus on reducing these errors to provide acceptable results from the
computation point of view. Interestingly, with extreme VOS, these errors can also
reveal significant information about the underlying physical system and random
variations therein. As a result, these errors can be methodically profiled to extract
information about the process variation in a computational unit. Therefore, in this
dissertation, we also employ error profiling techniques along with the basic key-based
authentication schemes to create lightweight device authentication protocols.
Finally, intrinsic properties of hardware clocks can provide novel ways of device
fingerprinting and authentication. The clock signatures can be used for real-time
authentication of electromagnetic signals where some temporal properties of the
signal are known. In the last part of this dissertation, we elaborate our studies
on data authentication using hardware clocks. As an example, we propose a GPS
signature authentication and spoofing detection technique using physical properties
such as the frequency skew and drift of hardware clocks in GPS receivers.
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6.2 Fabricated memristor and its dimensions. The top (light colored)
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The width of the top and bottom crossbars are 2µm on average.
In between the top and bottom crossbars, a thin film of HfOx is
deposited using atomic layer deposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
xii
6.3 Sample I-V curve for the fabricated memristor. Multiple read-write
cycle of the memristor is provided. The violet, sky-blue and red
lines represent a LRS to HRS transition when the voltage across a
memristor at a low resistive state is varied from +4 to -4V. The green,
yellow and dark-blue lines represent a HRS to LRS transition when
the voltage across a memristor at a high resistive state is varied from
-4 to +4V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
xiii
List of Abbreviations
CAN Controller area Network
CLA Carry Look-ahead adders
CMOS Complementary metaloxidesemiconductor
DoS Denial of service
DRAM Dynamic random-access memory
GPS Global positioning system
HB Hopper and Blum authentication
HCA Han-Carlson adder
IoT Internet-of-things
LPN Learning parity in the presence of noise
MIM Man-in-the-middle
PUF Physically uncloneable function
RAM Random-access memory
RCA Ripple Carry adders
RNG Random number generator
RRAM Resistive random access memory
PVT Process, supply voltage and temperature
VC Visual Cryptography




Hardware security is an emerging field that studies the application of security prim-
itives in hardware and their vulnerabilities. As new technologies emerge, the nature
of security primitives and vulnerabilities change, hence, studying security features
of such technologies have its unique benefits. Moreover, new technologies can pro-
vide exclusive hardware features useful for security purpose. Instead of making
hardware the weakest link in security (for example, side channel attacks), one can
employ hardware’s intrinsic properties to enhance security. Therefore, in this work,
we have proposed several lightweight hardware intrinsic security solutions which try
to solve problems with authentication of entities.
Ubiquitous deployment of sensors, actuators, data acquisition systems, pro-
cessing modules, cloud servers, and electronic components interconnected by wired
and wireless communication technology is leading to the era of the Internet of
Things(IoT). Implementation of Internet-of-Things is critically dependent on a well-
designed interconnected network between the Things. As the number of Things
grows, constraints on the critical factors such as cost, area, and power, etc. become
tighter, and in most cases forces the designer to either sacrifice some design aspects
or innovate new design to meet all the requirements. Unfortunately, one of the stan-
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dard sacrifices is made on the security of the low power components in the network
such as the sensors, data acquisition units or on-field data processing units[8].
Compromising regarding security for low power modules can pose severe threats
to the complete system and its outputs. Therefore, the design should opt for
Internet-of-Trusted-Things, where the system components are trusted and provides
accurate data to the system. Authentication creates the first layer of trust between
two entities-the provers and the verifier. Well-designed secure authentication proto-
cols require sufficient processing powers and hardware available to both prover and
the verifier for calculating cryptographic primitives needed for authentication. This
classic strategy can become unfeasible for low power modules where the claimants
can constitute low-power sensor nodes that do not have enough processing capability
to realize essential cryptographic functions.
To address these issues we have worked on hardware-dependent low power
lightweight authentication techniques. We are focusing on several hardware primi-
tives: resistive memory based circuits and systems, voltage over-scaled systems and
hardware clocks.
In recent years, metal-oxide-based resistive switching memories (RRAMs or
memristors) have drawn significant research attention due to their potential appli-
cation in next-generation low-power nanoelectronic non-volatile memory systems [9].
Simple device geometry, high density, and built-in non-volatile features have made
memristors appealing as a replacement for flash memory and DRAM. Moreover,
studies on on-chip CMOS compatibility of memristors have shown promising results
indicating the capability of replacing on-chip SRAMs [10]. Logic processing and
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possible neuromorphic computation in functional resistive switching memories may
one day replace CMOS with memristors [11]. With promises regarding the energy
efficiency of memristors, it is a question of when not whether memristors will be used
routinely in IoT system design. Hardware security research works are mostly built
on the available traditional circuit building blocks and components, and therefore,
the addition of memristor-based circuits will enrich the toolset for designing hard-
ware security primitives. Hence, we explore exciting properties of memristor-based
circuits and systems for developing lightweight authentication protocols.
The second hardware design primitive we are interested is hardware designs
based on voltage over-scaling. The design of digital circuits and systems are focused
on the deterministic results, i.e., for identical inputs, application of any given design
will yield identical output. As we are pushing the boundaries of power efficiency,
we are introducing the effects of analog nature of the circuit components involved
in the computation. One of the standard power reduction techniques is voltage
over-scaling (VOS). In VOS, the digital circuit used for calculation is operated un-
der the nominal voltage, which guarantees correct output for all input condition
under the operating environment. Since the dynamic power consumed in a VLSI
chip is squarely, and static power is proportional to the operating voltage, reducing
the operating voltage under the prescribed margin can result in considerable power
savings. However, the effect of this voltage over-scaling will be translated into er-
rors generated during a computation. These errors are a function of supply voltage
and physical and environmental variations. Research works in VOS problems focus
on reducing these errors to provide acceptable results from a computation. Inter-
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estingly, with extreme VOS, this error can reveal significant information about the
underlying physical system. Therefore, VOS not only have great promise in low
power computing but also can be used for realizing physically unclonable functions
without adding hardware overhead. This will, in turn, enable lightweight hardware
security primitives in low power devices.
Finally, we revisit the applicability of hardware clocks for authentication and
fingerprinting. We find that time-varying intrinsic properties of free-running crystal
oscillators can be useful in designing signal authentication and spoofing detection
mechanisms. We study the employability of hardware oscillators for authenticating
commodity signals used in embedded systems. One such example can be Global
positioning system (GPS) signals. GPS has become an essential tool for precise time
measurement, positioning, navigation and synchronization over distributed systems,
and is an integrated part of IoT architecture. Civilian GPS signals are not encrypted
and can easily be replicated to launch spoofing attacks. Demonstration of such GPS
spoofing attacks is available in current literature. Although there exist different
methods for signal level and data-level spoofing detection for GPS signals, each has
their limitations, can be spoofed by a determined adversary and in most case, their
implementation is prohibited by the cost of additional circuits and radio-frequency
components. To address this problem, we develop a simple, fast, and tamper-proof
hardware dependent signal authentication and spoofing detection mechanism for
civilian navigation signals.
The following chapters describe our works on designing hardware oriented
lightweight authentication protocols for users, devices, and signals using the physi-
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cal properties of memory components, computing units, and hardware clocks. We
start with a review of memristors used in authentication in chapter 2 and present our
single and multi-user authentication protocols in chapter 3. Chapter 4 introduces
the concepts of voltage overscaling and discusses how voltage overscaling can be used
in hardware-based security in IoT applications. In chapter 5, we demonstrate the
promises of hardware clocks in authenticating GPS signals. Finally, we conclude in
chapter 6, with future work direction in improving memristor-based security proto-
cols, modeling for VOS systems and designing physical layer key distribution using
visual cryptography. In sum, the contribution of this work are the following:
• First, we have presented a comprehensive study of existing memristor based
hardware authentication techniques and their weaknesses for extending the
state-of-the-art for memory component dependent authentication techniques.
• Then, we have developed two single user authentication technique and one
multi-user authentication technique using memristive hardware component.
We have discussed the potential attacks on these protocols and provided cor-
responding countermeasures for understanding the merits of the proposed
schemes regarding security. We also performed HSPICE simulation using
PTM’s 65nm MOSFET model and Stanford memristor model to validate the
reliability of these authentication protocols.
• Next, we have demonstrated that voltage over-scaling based computing leaves
a process variation dependent device signature in the approximate results.
Binding this process variation dependent device signature with basic key based
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authentication schemes; we have propose a simple authentication mechanism
using voltage overscaling and analyzed the reliability of this scheme using
FreePDK’s 45nm MOSFET model.
• Finally, we have presented a data-level authentication mechanism for GNSS
signals that rely on intrinsic hardware properties of a free-running crystal
oscillator. We have developed a Kalman -filter based signal authentiaction
and spoofing detection unit to authenticate GPS signals in real time. We have
reported the applicability and reliability of this proposed spoofing detection
technique for applications targeting the Internet of Things.
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Chapter 2: Memristors and Authentication: A Review
2.1 Introduction
High-density memristive crossbar arrays are promising candidates for next-generation
memory solutions with in-memory computing capabilities[9]. Simple device geom-
etry, high density, and built-in non-volatile features have made memristors a re-
placement for flash memory and DRAM. However, commercial products based on
memristors are still quite elusive. Therefore, for developing competitive products
further research on the fabrication process, yield, novel computer architecture, and
circuit design are required. Furthermore, applications outside memory operation
such as security and cryptographic applications need to be explored to harness the
unique characteristics of memristive devices. For example, time-dependent switching
properties of metal-oxide-based resistive memories have demonstrated applications
in Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) designs[12],[13]. These works have at-
tracted new ideas and memristor-based research in the area of hardware-dependent
security and trust. In the advent of memristors for memory design and in-memory
computation, works exploring memristor-based security primitives such as physically
unclonable functions[14],[12], random number generators[15] and chaotic circuits for
secure communication [16] etc. are also gaining research attention. This chapter
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chronicles these efforts.
Conventional authentication methods using low-entropy user-passwords are
weak and severely vulnerable to dictionary attacks. Although password-authenticated
key exchange protocols can render secure authentication against active and passive
attackers, they are susceptible to dictionary attacks at the authentication server.
Secret sharing schemes can be useful in creating and distribution authentication
secrets over multiple servers for resisting dictionary attacks at the server-side. How-
ever, general secret sharing mechanisms such as the Shamir’s secret sharing algo-
rithm and its derivatives are hardware independent and require significant power
and computation capabilities. Therefore, with the advent of distributed Internet-
of-Things (IoT) systems, authentication would become one of the standard security
challenges for low-power IoT nodes. In chapter 2 and 3, we have explored how the
intrinsic physical properties of memristors can be useful in tackling this problem.
2.2 Fundamentals on Authentication
Identity and entity authentication depends on the sharing a secret between two
parties- the verifier and the prover. In this section, we introduce common secret
sharing and user-authentication mechanisms.
2.2.1 Single User Authentication
For authenticating a single user, the verifier authenticates the singular prover based
on a secret that can be derived from (1) something that is known by both parties
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(such as passwords), or (2) something possessed by the prover (such as hardware
keys), or (3) something inherent (such as signatures, biometric signals etc. of the
prover) [1]. According to Menezes et al. common properties of authentication proto-
cols includes “reciprocity of identification, computational efficiency, communication
efficiency, nature of security guarantee and the nature of security storage” [1].
Passwords are the most commonly used user authentication mechanism where
the authenticator stores the (username, password (or its hashed value)) pair for
different prover and use this pair to identify a prover. To strengthen this protocol
several steps can be taken such as (i) different password rules can be introduced, (ii)
password salting can be performed, or (iii) password mapping can be slowed down
which will make it difficult for an attacker to test a large number of trial passes
[1]. Frequent attacks on password schemes are replay attack and exhaustive and
dictionary password search. Furthermore, leaking of an authenticator’s database
containing (username, password) can cause significant threat[17].
For all of these weaknesses of password schemes, challenge-response identifica-
tion becomes a step toward strong authentication where the authentic parties share
a sequence of secret one time passwords or challenge response pairs which are usually
derived from some one-way functions or a challenge-response table. Furthermore, a
zero-knowledge protocol that verifies an entity through its possession of the knowl-
edge of the secret instead the exact secret is also a strong authentication scheme
[1].
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Figure 2.1: An instance of Unix password mapping in practice [1]. User password is
truncated to 8 ASCII characters and used as a 56-bit key (k) to encrypt a a known
plaintext (64-zero bit seed I0) using Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm.
The output of this encryption is fed back into the algorithm again as (I1) and the
process continues for 25 rounds. The final output (i.e., I25) is repacked with a user
given 12 bit-salt and stored as an encrypted password at /etc/passwd.
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2.2.2 Secret Sharing and Multiple User Authentication
Secret sharing is a well-studied problem which seeks to distribute pieces of infor-
mation (or called the secret) to multiple parties in a way such that the information
(the secret) can be revealed when all or a sufficiently large subset of the individuals
contribute their shares. Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm [18] defines the concept
of threshold scheme for secret sharing. This (k, n) threshold scheme (where k ≤ n)
can be described as follows:
Definition 2.1 : Assume that a secret S memristor to be shared by n parties.
The secret is divided into n pieces such that, the knowledge of k or more pieces would
be sufficient to reconstruct S. However, if the knowledge of any k − 1 pieces or less
is available, it would be impossible to restore S.
A direct application of this problem is the multi-user authentication prob-
lem, where at least k authentic users must present their shares to gain access to a
system. One example of this is the two-person rule originally designed to prevent
the accidental or malicious launch of nuclear weapons by a single individual. One
may argue that authenticating each user and counting the authenticated users can
trivially solve the multi-user authentication problem. This approach does address
the issue but has two significant drawbacks in scalability and user privacy. First,
the expensive authentication protocol has to be applied at least k times, and some
mechanism to check duplicate users must be implemented. Second, unlike the tra-
ditional secret share dependent approaches [18, 19, 20, 21], this method will reveal
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the identity of each authenticated user, creating user privacy concerns.
Shamir [18] and Blakley [19] independently proposed solutions for the afore-
mentioned problem of (k, n)-threshold scheme. More specifically, Blakley used tech-
niques from finite geometry to provide a solution for safeguarding and sharing cryp-
tographic keys. Shamir’s solution is designed on the polynomial interpolation over a
finite field. It has since become a widely acceptable solution for secure secret shar-
ing and distribution of cryptographic keys. A detailed explanation of the scheme
and the impact of subsequent works can be found in [20]. One of the drawbacks of
these early solutions is their high computational cost. For example, Shamir’s secret
sharing algorithm requires calculations over the finite field during both secret share
generation phase and secret reconstruction phase. This, in turn, requires complex
digital circuitry for hardware implementation, which is known to be more efficient
than the software implementation.
A simple hardware-oriented secret sharing model was first proposed by Naor
and Shamir [21] as the Visual Cryptography(VC) scheme. It is an alternative
lightweight system for secret sharing to Shamir’s original scheme. In visual cryp-
tography, the secret shared among multiple parties is merely an image. The secret
image is broken into n pieces, and each piece is printed on a transparency. When
k or more pieces of these transparencies are placed on a stack, the secret image is
revealed and can be comprehended by human eyes. In this scheme, the secret share
generation memristor only straightforward calculations, and the revelation of the
secret image does not involve any mathematical computation. In essence, this is
an example of how inherent physical properties of hardware can be used in design-
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ing lightweight security primitives to avoid complex mathematical computation and
formal cryptography protocols. Naor and Pinkas first discussed the application of
visual cryptography for authentication and identification [22].
Secret sharing has also seen its application in securely sharing and destroying
encrypted data. For example, Vanish computer project at the University of Wash-
ington uses a random key to encrypt data and then distributes them across several
nodes in a P2P network as a shared secret [23]. To decrypt the message, at least
k-out-of-n nodes on the system must be accessible. The fundamental idea of data
destruction over time was that “the number of secret-sharing nodes on the network
decreases over time and thus once the total number of interested parties becomes less
than a given threshold (i.e., k) the secret key eventually becomes non-reconstructible,
and thus the encrypted data vanishes” [23].
2.2.3 Hardware-based Authentication
The first problem for authentication is key-generation. Assume a verifier Alice tries
to authenticate/identify a prover Bob. For solving this authentication problem, a
signature of Bob is required to be stored by the Alice to verify Bob. This procedure
poses several security challenges. First, the human-generated keys such as passwords
are rarely random and are vulnerable to dictionary attacks. One can use machine-
generated private keys. However, machine-generated keys are difficult to remember,
and storing such keys in non-volatile memory can easily leak this secret key to an
adversary.
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Physically Unclonable Functions [24, 25, 26] can provide some solutions to
key generation and storage problem. Silicon PUFs are on-chip circuitry that can
extract fabrication variations to generate chip-dependent PUF data that can be used
as secret keys or as seeds of random number generators. For using PUFs in device
authentication, one can hash a password with the device signature to increase the
entropy of the private keys and generate a unique device dependent key. Moreover,
PUFs does not store the key; rather the key exists when the device is powered on,
and therefore, to extract(or leak) a key an adversary memristor to attack the system
while it is up and running, which is significantly harder[27]. Therefore, new design
technologies such as resistive memory-based random number generators and PUFs
can be useful in solving primary key generation and storage challenges.
In the following sections, we will present how challenge-response pairs(CRP)
can be generated from hardware, especially memristive hardware. There are several
ways these CRPs are used for device authentication purposes. Physical randomness
in these PUF designs are considered inherently independent and identically dis-
tributed. Therefore, learning attacks that focus on modeling the internal operation
of the PUF fails. The key generation and authentication model for general PUFs
are given below.
Algorithm 1 PUF based Key Generation
1: procedure (C,R)← KeyGen(1λ)
2: Assume a PUF can provide `-pairs of challenge-response.




Enrollment: The verifier uses the key generation algorithm to generate the secret
(C,R) from a PUF P . The verifier keeps (C,R) and the prover owns the PUF.
Table 2.1: Single round interactive authentication for protocol using a PUF with
high entropy content
Prover(P ) Verifier(C,R)
Select a random challenge c
$← C
c←−
Apply c to the PUF P and read
the response r′ = PUF (c)
r′−→
If r′ = r (where r is the recorded
response for c), accept, else reject.
One of the key weakness of such protocol is that the changes in operating
conditions and environmental factor can change the physical responses of a PUF
system. Therefore, such authentication has high completeness for the systems that
have stable PUF bits over all the operating conditions. For example, SHIC PUFs
keeps the PUF bits as a non-volatile memory content that has an excellent memory
retention capability. However, these PUFs are vulnerable to read-out attack and
therefore, slowing down of reading access is required for a security guarantee.
Moreover, common PUF designs require extensive hardware and data process-
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ing peripherals to harness the entropy from the physical variation. For example,
Figure 2.2 shows a Vivado block diagram of a complete PUF implementation in
Xilinx FPGA.
In the first part of this dissertation, we will discuss the use of memristive
hardware in design PUFs and other security primitives for authentication. Hence,
in the next section, we introduce the physics behind the modeling of memristors for
simulation and experimentation.
2.3 Basics of Memristors
According to the classical definition by Leon Chua, instantaneous resistance of a









−∞ i(τ)dτ is the electric charge, φ(q) is the magnetic flux, v(t) is the
voltage across the device, and i(t) is the electric current flowing in the device at
time t [28]. Therefore, from equation 2.1, we can see that the resistance (also known
as memristance M(q)) of an ideal memristor is dependent on the current that has
previously passed through the device.
Chua and Kang generalized the concept of memristors and memristive sys-
tem in [29]. It was theoretically argued that the dynamic properties of a current

























































































































v(t) = M(w, i)× i(t) (2.3)
where, M(w, i) is the generalized resistance of the memristive system and
f(w, i) is a function that captures the boundary behavior and various nonlinear
dynamical effects. From these equations, it can be seen that for zero input current
there will be a zero output voltage, irrespective of the state variable w. Hence, this
dynamic system has a zero-crossing Lissajous figure-like input-output relationship
[29]. This input-output characteristic in the v − i plane is also known as pinched
hysteresis loop of memristors, and it is considered to be a signature property of
this circuit element [30, 31]. As the frequency of the signal along the memristor
increases, this zero-crossing pinched hysteresis loop shrinks in size, and it becomes
a straight line when the frequency approaches infinity [31].
This fundamental circuit theoretic model was first realized in a MIM-based
device structure at HP Labs [2]. The memristor discovered by HP Labs consists of a
thin film (5 nm) with of insulating TiO2 sandwiched between platinum contacts in
the simple metal-insulator-metal (MIM) structure [2]. Several transport models have
been proposed to explain the electronic properties of this memristor and devices of
similar construction. These models primarily attempt to relate the carrier transport
mechanism in the thin films with the system of equations 2.1-2.3. Each model
defines the generalized resistance/memristance M(w, i) and the function f(w, i)
which encapsulates the memristive nature of these devices. We discuss some of
these memristor models below. Before going into details, we introduce common
circuit symbols used for memristors in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: (a) Simplified view of MIM structure for memristors; 2.3(b) and 2.3(c)
shows the common circuit symbols used for memristors in circuit design.
Figure 2.4: SET-RESET operation in a memristor.
2.3.1 Linear and Non-Linear Ion-Drift Models
The simplest model that relates the resistivity of the HP-devices with memristors
is the linear ion-drift model proposed by Strukov et al [2]. In this model, the
governing carrier transport in the thin film of the memristor is described by linear
drift of oxygen vacancies. Assume w(t) as the thickness of the doped region in the
thin-film which is created by the linear drift of charged oxygen vacancies (dopants)
at a given applied bias. Then, considering a linear ion-drift model, one can write
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the state equation for the state variable w(t) as:
dw
dt




where D is the film thickness of the memristor, µv is the average ion mobility of
oxygen vacancies in TiO2, (D − w) is the size of the undoped region. Ron is the
resistance of the memristor when it is completely doped (i.e., w = D), and Roff is
the resistance when it is completely undoped (i.e., w = 0) as shown in Figure 2.5.





































Figure 2.5: Strukov model of a Pt− TiO2−x − Pt device [2].
The linear ion-drift model provides a simple explanation of the transport mech-
anism in a memristor. It does not consider boundary effects and non-linear dopant
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where g(w, i) is a window function that captures the physics near the device bound-
ary. Several approximations for the window function can be found in the literature
[32, 3, 33, 34]. These window functions are listed in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Common window functions to capture physics near device boundary in
memristors
Author Window Function






















For these window functions, p is a positive integer that controls the rate of
change of w near the device boundary, u(i) is the step function, and j controls the
maximum value of g(w). Although the models described above capture fundamental
device properties, they are insufficient to explain the underlying higher order non-
linearity of actual devices.
To simulate these models for VLSI designs, simple SPICE representations are
presented in [3, 34, 35] etc. The SPICE model proposed by Biolek et al. in [3] and its
derivatives are widely used in the literature for simulating HP memristors. In this
circuit, the window function is incorporated using user-defined function f() and the
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memory effects are incorporated using a feedback controlled integrator. The circuit
diagram for the model is given in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: SPICE model of a memristor proposed in [3]. Here Vmem and Imem are
the voltage and current across the memristor, k = µvRon
D2
, ∆R = Ron − Roff , Cw
represents the doped layer of width w and v(w) is the voltage across the layer.
All of the discussed linear and non-linear drift models assume that electron
transport in memristors is due to the drift of carriers under electric field in the doped
and undoped regions. However, quantum mechanical effects need to be considered
for accurately describing carrier transport in these nano-devices. Pickett et al. first
incorporated the quantum mechanical effects in the underlying memristor model to
give a detailed description of the complex carrier dynamics in memristors [36] as
discussed next.
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2.3.2 Quantum Mechanical Models
Pickett et al. explain the observed complex carrier dynamics in TiO2 based mem-
ristors using Simmons tunneling theory [37] and drift mechanisms of the carriers.
A tunnel barrier is considered between the conducting channel and the platinum
electrode of the device. An ohmic resistor in series with this tunnel barrier is used
to explain the device characteristics. The state variable in this model is represented
by the width of the tunnel barrier. This model is called the Pickett’s model or

























where, foff , fon, ioff , ion, aoff , aon, wc, and b are fitting parameters. The current i













Here, q is the elementary electronic charge, A is the average channel area, φI is the







If we consider Rs as the series resistance of the channel and vg is the voltage across
the tunnel barrier, then the voltage across the device v can be written as:
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v = vg + vR = vg + iRs (2.11)
To incorporate this model in circuit simulation, Abdalla et al. provided a
SPICE model based on equation 2.8-2.11 in [4] as given in Figure 2.7. This cir-
cuit is derived from equations 2.8-2.11 and uses experimental values to define its
parameters. Although this model tries to accurately represent the device physics,
simulating this model overestimates current by around 20% and causes the simulated
memristor to switch faster than the experimental memristor [4].
Figure 2.7: (a) SPICE model of a memristor proposed by Abdalla et al [4]. Here, the
current and voltages are given by equations 2.9-2.11. Figure 2.7(b) represents the
state-space model of the device represented by Figure 2.7(a) where C is the width





where Goff and Gon are the right hand side of equation 2.8 for i > 0 and i < 0
respectively.
Pickett’s model provides a good insight of the carrier dynamics and considers
a near accurate physical model. However, this model is computationally expen-
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sive. For device simulation, Kvatinsky et al. proposed a simplified version known
as the threshold adaptive memristor (TEAM) model to reduce the computational
complexity of Pickett’s model [38]. There exist similar models such as the Boundary
Condition memristor (BCM) model presented in [39] which are based on the sim-
plified versions of equations 2.8-2.11. Overall, Pickett’s model and the subsequently
simplified models of memristors provides a good starting point for understanding
fundamental carrier dynamics in a physical memristor.
The equations 2.4-2.11 are specifically derived for the TiO2-based memris-
tive devices. For other metal-oxide thin film based memristors, the characteristic
equation of the device follows a similar pattern.
In this dissertation, we have demonstrated our experiments on theHfOx based
memristors. These devices have an individual design and marked differences from
the TiO2 based memristors developed by HP Labs. HfOx based memristive de-
vices have large ON/OFF ratio, multi-bit storage capacity and excellent switching
endurance (≥ 106 cycles) [9], and therefore, they are promising candidates for mem-
ristive designs. Although our experiments are devised and performed on this device
platform, our theoretical constructs for secret-sharing and authentication is by no
means restricted only to HfOx based memristors.
The conductive filament formation in the HfOx thin-film essentially defines
the internal state variable g for a HfOx based memristor. The current in the
memristor is also determined by the electron tunneling in metal-insulator boundary.
Thus, the analytical model of the thin-film evolution in a HfOx-based memristor
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where g is the state variable for the device which represents the spatial distance
between the conductive filament in the oxide and the metal boundary, q is the
electron charge, L is the device filament thickness, V is the applied voltage, T is
the device temperature, Ea,m, γ, ν0 are device dependent physical parameters. The
current-voltage relationship in the device is given by the following equation:





where I0, V0, g0 are device dependent physical parameters.
Memristors are usually fabricated in a crossbar fashion. In a crossbar memory
array, a memristor unit can contain a single resistor (1M configuration) or a tran-
sistor and a memristor (1T1M configuration). In this work, we consider transistor
controlled operations because such designs can provide better control, have immu-
nity to sneak path currents, and can deliver reliable performance [9]. Figure 2.8
shows basic 1T1M configuration.
Figure 2.8: One-transistor-one-memristor (1T1M) configuration of an memristor
cell. A MOSFET is used for controlling the current flowing through the memristor.
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2.4 Memristors in Authentication
Memristors have some unique properties useful for security applications such as
non-volatility, bias-dependent write-time, fabrication variations in a filament, non-
linearity in the current-voltage relationship [41].
2.4.1 Standard Features of Memristors
We list intrinsic hardware properties of memristors that are used to design the
proposed secret sharing based user authentication protocols.
F1 Non-volatility: Memristors are nonvolatile in nature. For binary operations,
two resistance values are associated with each memristor: resistance due to
lowest resistive state (LRS) or resistance due to highest resistive state (HRS).
However, in analog operation, one finds that there is a continuous spectrum
of resistance in between and beyond LRS and HRS that can be achieved.
However, for reliable operation, the LRS and HRS of a given device are usually
kept near constant and current limiting approach is used for safeguarding
against resistance runaway. LRS and HRS are usually different by several
orders of magnitude regarding their resistances.
Moreover, the initial states (i.e., the resistive state of an unutilized device)
of a given distribution of memristor population can be random. This random
distribution along with the non-volatile nature of the memory can be used as
a seed for generating secure random keys.
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F2 Bias dependent write-time: Write-time of a memristive device can be
defined as the time required for switching a device from one resistive state to
another (i.e., from LRS to HRS or from HRS to LRS). For example, switching
time of the SET/RESET operation of HfOx devices have been found to be
exponentially dependent on the amplitude of the RESET voltage [40] as shown
in the Fig 2.9. Thus, by adjusting the bias voltage, one can manipulate the
write-time required for a given state transition. The memristor mentioned
above based PUF approaches have utilized this feature[12].
Figure 2.9: Variation of memristor SET-time as a function of bias voltage. We have
used 1R configuration with I0 = 10µA, L = 12nm and the parameters listed at Table
3.4. Note that, with a linear increase in the SET voltage, there is an exponential
decrease in the total time required for the state-transition.
F3 Pulse-Controlled State Transition: Further control and reliability on the
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filament growth can be achieved by employing pulsed bias voltages, where the
duration of the pulse (tp) is a fraction of the complete write-time (twr), i.e.,
twr = ntp (2.14)
F4 Fabrication variation in filament thickness: Physical properties of a
memristor vary significantly with the manufacturing variation in the filament
thickness. For example, equation 2.4 shows that the change in resistive state
is proportional to the sinh() function of the inverse of the film thickness L.
Therefore, a small change in film thickness can lead to a significant measur-
able change in the resistance of the device. Such random variability resulting
from fabrication variations can be exploited to design security features such
as device authentication. As shown in Figure 2.10, the write-time of HRS to
















































Figure 2.10: Variation of memristor SET-time as a function of filament thickness.
We have used 1R configuration with I0 = 10µA, VSET = 1.7V and the parameters
listed at Table 3.4. Note that, with a linear increase in the filament thickness, there
is an exponential decrease in the total time required for the state-transition.
F5 Non-linearity: From the basic equations presented in the previous sections,
it can be seen that the resistive-switching devices are highly nonlinear. De-
vice nonlinearity is a highly sought after property for secure hardware design,
and therefore, harnessing this property will provide a novel implementation of
standard hardware security protocols such as PUFs. This feature is confirmed
in our experiments and can be seen from the figures presented in this section.
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2.4.2 Existing Designs for Memristor-based Physically Uncloneable
Functions
Physically Unclonable Functions are hardware-dependent security primitives that
harness physical variation of a silicon chip to generate unique chip-dependent challenge-
response pairs (CRPs). PUF CRPs can be used for secret key generation, seeding
of random number generators, and in CRP-based authentication and attestation.
Physical dependence of PUF primitives has opened up new avenues for implementing
hardware intrinsic security and trust.
Physical variation in the thin film of memristors has a pronounced effect on
their device characteristics such as the random variation in write-time for different
devices, random distribution of measured resistance after the device forming step
during fabrication, and a random resistive path between higher and lower resistive
states. These fundamental properties provide an ideal situation to build memristor-
based PUFs.
There have been several potential memristor-based PUF-designs in current
literature with different use case and attack models. Since PUFs are inherently
related to hardware-based authentication, we will assume a simple example scenario
where an entity Alice wants to authenticate another entity, Bob. Malice plays the
role of an attacker who subverts the authentication mechanism. Below we have
summarized the basics of operation of these PUFs.
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2.4.2.1 Nano PPUF
Memristor-based crossbars are used for designing one of the first memristor-based
PUFs called nano-PPUF [42]. A simulation model of the physical design of a public
PUF is publicly available; however, simulation complexity can create a time-bound
authentication protocol. The attack model assumes a computationally bounded
adversary unable to simulate the exact output for a given PUF design. The non-
linear equations governing the current-voltage relationship of memristors and the
viability of fabricating large memristive crossbars provide the simulation complexity
required by this PUF model.
In this PUF design, a public registry contains the simulation model for a
given user’s (Bob’s) memristive PUF. When Alice wants to authenticate Bob, she
first sends a random challenge vector VC = {v1, v2, . . . vn}, where, vi represents
a physical input. For the given PPUF at [42], VC is the voltage applied to an
n × n memristor-crossbar. Since Bob has the physical memristor, he can correctly
respond to Alice’s challenge. He sends the correct response vector VR. For a
computationally-bounded attacker Malice, completing this step would require sim-
ulating the complete crossbar, which would be computationally prohibitive. For
completing the authentication, Alice then picks a subsection of Bob’s crossbar (a
polyomino) and requests the voltages at the boundaries of this polyomino. Bob
sends the measurement and simulation results. Alice can accurately simulate the
smaller polyomino using VC and VR, and verify Bob’s results. Thus, Alice can
authenticate Bob.
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This initial PUF design suffers from several crucial drawbacks. The crossbar
simulation and the results from the physical crossbar will only match if the physical
conditions that affect the current in a memristor (such as temperature, history of
current flow, aging) remain the same. This is a difficult condition to fulfill for such
design. Moreover, an attacker can try machine learning and model building attacks
on passively obtained challenge responses to breaking the authentication scheme.
Additional improvements considering these physical effects on this PUF design are
discussed in [43] and [44].
2.4.2.2 CMOS-Memristive PUF
Nano-PPUF uses memristive-crossbars to generate unique challenge-response pairs.
Unique device properties of single memristor cells are also used for designing other
PUFs and authentication system discussed in [5, 45, 46, 47, 41]. Most of these works
depend on the bias-dependent write-time and fabrication variations of memristors.
For example, memory-based PUF cells proposed in [5] uses the fabrication variation
dependent write-time differences as an entropy source. Circuit design for this PUF
is shown in Figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.11: 1-bit memristive memory based PUF cell proposed in [5].
The principle of operation for this PUF is simple. First a RESET signal is
applied using NEG = 1 and R̄/W = 1. This puts the memristor M in a high
resistive state (HRS). Then a SET operation is performed with a write pulse twr,min
applied at VWR and NEG = 0. The write pulse twr,min is selected in a way that
the likelihood of state transition is 50%. Since the write-time of memristors are
random for a given voltage due to the physical randomness in their construction,
the circuit (Figure 2.11) can harness 1-bit of entropy from the memristor. With a
read operation R̄/W = 0 and a challenge bit, one can receive a 1-bit response from
this PUF circuit.
Similar weaknesses such as the effect of aging, noise at the supply voltage as
discussed for the Nano-PPUF exist for this design also. An improvement of this
design can be made by dividing the twr,min into smaller pulses and use the number
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of pulses as a challenge vector as described in [41]. Improved PUF design with
proper SET time determination for the cell shown in Figure 2.11 is also reported by
Rose et al. in [45]. Mazady et. al. [48] have experimentally verified the proposed
design.
The second PUF design proposed in [5] is dependent on the stochastic nature
of filament formation of memristors during fabrication. Two memristors connected
laterally (i.e., they share the same bottom electrode) is used for a PUF cell in this
design. The top electrodes of these two memristors are connected to VDD and GND
respectively as shown in Figure 2.12. The operation for bit-generation is simple.
Experimental results have suggested that a lateral SET operation can SET both
of the devices; however, a lateral RESET puts one of the devices to HRS, and the
other remains in LRS. This switching is dependent on the difference in the stochastic
variation of these two laterally connected device. By comparing which one of the
device has state transition, a single bit of entropy can be generated. The circuit
schematics for the bit extraction is given in detail at [5].
Figure 2.12: Laterally connected memristors for designing PUF cell [5]
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2.4.2.3 Memristive Super-High Information Content (SHIC) PUF
The high packing density of memristive crossbar is useful for creating large memo-
ries with small area footprints. Passive crossbar arrays for memristors can hold a
large amount of information content which can be used for designing SHIC-PUFs
discussed in [49]. SHIC-PUFs have two fundamental component: a high-density
memory with random information content and a slow readout technique for this
memory. It should be noted that the conventional memory designs are focused on
fast readout circuitry for memristors due to the requirement of faster data processing
and storage. However, this leads to rapid leaking the random information stored in
a SHIC-PUF. Therefore, this PUF requires particular readout mechanism to reduce
the information leakage. These are strong PUFs with linear CRPs.
The high density of the memristor crossbars makes memristors an ideal candi-
date for a SHIC-PUF. Some memristor designs require a initial programming step
(also known as the forming step) after fabrication, where the device is formed (i.e.,
becomes a memristive device instead of a common resistor). Memory contents in
a memristive memory are found to be random after a forming step. This ran-
dom startup resistive states can be the entropy source for such PUFs. Furthermore,
probing attack on compact memristive crossbar is difficult, which makes such design
secure against probing attacks.
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2.5 Conclusions
With the recent advances in memristors as a potential building block for future
hardware, it becomes an important and timely topic to study the role that mem-
ristors may play in hardware security. To address this issue, this chapter presents
a survey on research activities on memristor modeling and potential application of
memristors in hardware-based authentication. First, we give an overview of the cur-
rent literature on memristor experimentation, characterization, and modeling which
includes Chua’s original theoretical prediction model, more detailed models based
on recent memristor implementations, and the SPICE simulation, models. Then, we
report the current research efforts on memristor-based physical unclonable function
designs. We observe that most of these works have limited scope and are based on
simplified memristor models which diminish their practical value in security appli-
cations. However, these approaches provide a glimpse of current state-of-the-art for
memristor-based CRP generation and authentication techniques.
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Chapter 3: User Authentication Protocol Design using Memristive
Hardware
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we address the problem of secure and lightweight authentication of
single and multiple entities in a computationally constrained system. We assume an
entity (say Alice the verifier) tries to simultaneously authenticate k-out-of-n-other
entities (B1, . . . Bk). This problem can be simplified as simultaneous verification of
k-out-of-n cryptographic keys. If these keys are generated from a secret that Alice
knows or possesses, then, instead of checking n-keys separately, Alice can use the
keys provided by B1, . . . Bk to regenerate her secret and authenticate all entities
at once. Note that, as Alice uses a k-out-of-n secret sharing scheme, Alice can
reconstruct the secret from any of the k-users shares. The problem of authenti-
cating a single user (say Bob) then reduces to a 1-out-of-1 authentication problem.
For avoiding collusion among the users, this procedure requires Alice to have some
interference in key/password generation process during the registration of the users.
Since our work focuses on a computationally constrained IoT system, we con-
sider using emerging memristor devices for secret sharing based user authentication.
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The key contributions of this chapter can be recognized as follows:
1. We design two single user authentication protocols and one multiple user au-
thentication protocols using memristive hardware.
2. We discuss the potential attacks on these protocols and provide correspond-
ing countermeasures for understanding the merits of the proposed schemes
regarding security.
3. Finally, we perform HSPICE simulation using PTM’s 65nm MOSFET model
and Stanford memristor model to validate the reliability of these authentica-
tion protocols.
The main advantage of our approach is that it does not need the compu-
tational expensive cryptographic techniques. In that sense, our approach can be
considered as a lightweight cryptographic method for secret sharing based authen-
tication. Intrinsic energy efficiency of memristive systems makes this even more
attractive. In section 3.2, we present the common requirements required from re-
sistive memory based devices for solving lightweight authentication problems, then
section 3.3 presents the common notation used in this chapter and section 3.4 de-
scribes the common utility functions applicable for memristive operation. At section
3.5-3.7, we propose single and multiple user authentication protocols using memris-
tive hardware. Finally, section 3.8 and 3.9 illustrates simulation of the authentica-
tion protocols in the proposed hardware and reports the reliability issues and their
countermeasures.
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3.2 Requirements for Memristor-Based Authentication
From the device features described in section 2.4.1, below we specify our assump-
tions on the expected device behavior that are needed for the design of the secret
sharing based user authentication protocols, and also give the justification of these
requirements and assumptions. For our discussion, let us assume that the SET op-
eration is achieved by a singular or multiple constant duration voltage-pulses which
are denoted by ON-pulses.
R1 Changes due to consecutive ON pulses are additive in nature.
When given sufficiently high frequency and proper amplitude, short duration
ON pulses can cause memristor resistance state transitions just like a longer
single voltage pulse. For example, if the device is not already in LRS, two
consecutive ON pulses would put the device in a lower resistive state than a
single ON pulse. As we can see from equation 2.4, with V=0, the rate of change
of the state is zero, so we would expect a device to retain its resistive state
with zero input voltage. Therefore, the device should need the same amount
of time with the bias voltage on when it is written using multiple short pulses
or a single long pulse. For example, if a device requires a 1.5V-100ns pulse to
go from HRS to LRS, it should show similar transition when ten (or a similar
number of that order) of 1.5V-10ns pulses are applied. This is validated in our
simulations as well.
R2 The memory elements are monotonic.
40
If the device is not in an LRS, applying an ON pulse will always decrease the
resistance, and its effect cannot be undone without resetting the device.
R3 Intermediate resistive state transitions are random; however, the number of
ON pulses remains nearly the same for different programming cycles.
As we have seen in memristor’s nonlinearity feature F5, when the memristor
device transitions from one resistive state to another, its intermediate resis-
tance does not change linearly with time. Instead, the change is exponential
and has random variations due to local Joule heating and stochastic nature
of ionic transportation through the thin-film. The can be verified by the I-V
relationship of memristor [9].
R4 The number of short duration pulses during the state transition cannot be
predetermined without information about the programming conditions.
This is the discrete version of requirements R1 under the assumption of R3.
In another word, one can not imply how many short duration pulses have
been applied by observing the intermediate resistance value during the state
transition. Furthermore, to learn the exact/an approximate number of pulses
required for a given state transition at a given bias, one memristor to observe
a complete programming cycle. At a given bias, it would be impossible to
extrapolate the number of pulses required by measuring the resistance change
of the device for an only small period during a transition.
R5 There exists a higher current level for which the device can be RESET to a
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non-recoverable high resistive state (NRHRS), i.e., the device cannot be SET
again after it reaches the NRHRS.
R6 Memristive devices stay at random resistive states after fabrication. A forming
bias voltage Vform is required to make the devices programmable.
3.3 Notations
In this chapter, the set of integers modulo an integer q ≥ 1 is denoted by Zq.
Matrices, vectors single elements over Zq are represented by consecutively upper
case bold letter, lower case bold letters and lower case letters such as X, x and x.
For a vector x, the length of the vector is denoted by |x|, ith element is represented by
x[i] and wt(x) denotes the Hamming weight (i.e., the number of indices for which
x[i] 6= 0 ) of the vector x. The Hamming distance between two binary matrices
are denoted by hd(A,B) (i.e., the number of indices for which A[i][j] 6= B[i][j]).
hdp(A,B) represents the parity of hd(A,B) (i.e, hdp(A,B) = 0 for even parity of
hd(A,B) and hdp(A,B) = 1 for odd parity of hd(A,B)). 0`×n represents a ` × n
null matrix. The Hadamard product of two matrices A,B is given by 〈A ◦ B〉.
Given two vectors x and y, z = x ⊕ y represents bitwise XOR operation of x and
y. Concatenation of two vectors are represented with || symbol. c $← {x ∈ Z}
represents a random sampling of x. We denote probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithms with upper case calligraphic alphabets such as A. Therefore, if A is
probabilistic, then for any input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ there exists a polynomial p(.) such that
the computation of a terminates in at most p(|x|) steps. All the physical quantities
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such as voltage, current and device names are denoted with upper case letters.
3.4 Utility Functions
Before proposing memristor based user authentication protocols, we first describe
the basic memristor utility functions that are critical for these protocols.
RESET: A RESET operation uses a fast negative biased pulse between the top and
the bottom electrode to put a memristor to the high resistive state (HRS).
SET: A SET operation puts a memristor to the low resistive state (LRS). For au-
thentication purpose, we will use the bias dependent write time variability during
set (transition from HRS to LRS) operation. We will use multiple short duration
ON pulses for setting the device instead of a longer ON pulse.
SET Pulse Count (SPC): The number of ON pulses required to transit a mem-
ristor from HRS to LRS.
Precondition: A k-bit precondition operation applies k consecutive ON pulses to
the memristor device. If the device reaches the LRS after kn pulse where (kn < k),
the device is RESET and the remaining (i.e., (k − kn)) pulses are applied.
Read State: No pulse for one cycle. Then detect whether the memristor device is
at HRS or LRS.
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3.5 Single User Authentication: Protocol I
For single user authentication, we will assume an interactive protocol between a
single prover P and a verifier V . Both the prover and the verifier has some knowledge
about a shared secret x. The secret is generate through a key-generation procedure
KeyGen(1λ),where λ is a security parameter. The authentication protocol responds
with the outputs accept or reject after a successful run of the protocol. First, we
present a simple key generation procedure using the intermediate state transition of
a memristor.
3.5.1 Description of Protocol I
In this protocol, the prover and the verifier participates on one time enrollment
phase that generates the secret using the key-generation algorithm KeyGen01 and
distribute to the parties. For authentication, multiple round of interactive authen-
tication (as presented in table 3.1) is performed.
Assumptions: Along with the requirements R1-R6, assume that there exists high
variability in the fabrication of the devices and the state transition of a memristor
with small voltage pulses are unique for each device and highly repeatable.
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Algorithm 2 Key Generation Using Resistive States
1: procedure x← KeyGen01(1λ, α) . α ∈ N is the experiment repetition value
2: For a given memristor R, select a set of {Vselect, VBL, VWL} that demonstrates
a complete programming cycle with an average write time twr,avg.
3: Assume the key length ` = nb, where n, b ∈ N. `, twr,avg, Vselect, VBL, VWL
values depend on the security parameter k.
4: for j=1 . . . α do
5: RESET R.
6: Apply n-consecutive pulses (where n = `/b, and b is the number of bits
used for representing a floating point number in the system) at the word line with
pulse width tp = twr,avg/n and measure the corresponding current Ii through R
after ith pulse, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
7: X[j, :]← I1||I2 . . . , ||In.
8: xa[i]← majority values of the ith column of X
9: Use a b-bit ADC to convert xa to a binary string x.
10: return x
Enrollment: The prover and the verifier use a random memristor M and
generates the `-bit secret x← KeyGen01(1λ). They also share a b-bit precondition
value s. The authentication protocol assumes that the verifier has the memristor
and the prover knows the secret state transitions of the memristor given by x. ε is
the predetermined error threshold for the authentication.
45
Table 3.1: Single round interactive authentication for Protocol I
Prover(x, s) Verifier(M, s, ε)
— RESET M
— Find the current Ii for the precondi-
tion value s using x
— Precondition(M,s)
— c
$← {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . n− s} : n =
`/b}
— Precondition(M,c)
— Measure the current
Irand with the parameters
{Vselect, VBL, VWL} specified at
the key generation step
Irand←−−−
— Find the distance (r) between the
current values Ii and I
′
rand at x, where
I ′rand is the near-most value of Irand.
r is approximately the number of ON
pulses required to be applied to mem-
ristor R at the s-state to produce Irand
r−→
— If abs(r− c) < ε accept, other-
wise reject.
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Update: After one successful round of authentication the prover and the
verifier both updates s← s+ r.
3.5.2 Hardware Design
Protocol I requires 1T1M memristive cell (as shown in Figure 2.8) with current mea-
suring capabilities. This protocol is designed based on the assumption that reducing
the bias voltage of the memristors increases the total write time and enables multi-
level operation of the device that is less susceptible to the effect of environmental
variation and Joule heating. Although elongating the write-time of a memristor
memory cell is less favorable for memory operation, it is a welcoming feature in
security, since it increases the read-out time for the entire contents of the memory
in several orders of magnitude. Recognizing the usefulness of this feature in the
security context is a key contribution of this work.
Figure 3.1: Bias dependent write time of a memristor.
For the realization of this protocol, we assume that the I-V curve during state
transitions are repeatable for a memristor for a given bias and environmental con-
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dition. From equation 2.1 it is evident that the non-linearity between the applied
voltage and the corresponding resistance can create the state transitions for a given
memristor unique. When the resistive characteristics are different for two different
memristors, different amount of voltage is required for obtaining the same level of re-
sistance [6]. Quantifying the application of bias voltage into voltage pulses, one can
generate secrets based on the number of pulses needed for a given state transition.
Figure 3.2: For memristive device with different programming cycle different volt-
ages are required to reach the same resistive level [6].
It should be noted that noise in the bias-source or read-out can cause small
changes in the resistive states that accumulate with time. From 2.1, we can see how
that the flux can accumulate over time with small perturbations as,





where φ0 is the initial flux. To avert such problem, Leon Chua proposed the
application of a voltage doublet with equal positive and negative read-out pulses[6].
3.5.3 Security Analysis
We assume an attacker A who wants to generate an accept from the verifier V .
Theorem 3.1: If A guesses at random, she has (1/n) chance of success, where
n = f(λ) = `/b is the number of voltage pulses required for a complete SET-RESET
cycle.
Proof: Since, the memristor requires n pulses for a complete SET-RESET
cycle, the response r is in r = {0, . . . n}. Therefore, the chance of success for
random guessing is 1/|R| = 1/n
The security can be improved by introducing multiple rounds and for β rounds
the chance of success for an attacker reduces to (1/nβ).
Theorem 3.2: Assume A can eavesdrop on the challenge response pair
(Irand, r) for the authentication. Then she can learn the complete challenge-response
by eavesdropping on an average of O(n2) consecutive communications.
Proof: If n-pulses are used for complete programming of the device, then, we
can assume that there are n distinct states in the device. Transitions between the
states can be represented by a fully connected graph of n vertices with n(n − 1)/2
edges. Therefore, to completely learn the state transition A needs to solve an
average of O(n(n − 1)/2) = O(n2) equations describing consecutive runs for the
authentication protocol.
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Therefore, we can see that the protocol is weak against eavesdropping attack.
Lowering the bias voltage of the memristor can exponentially increase the number of
pulses (n) and thus increase the security against eavesdropping and random guessing
attack, however, it would create increasing storage burden of O(n) to the prover.
Furthermore, this protocol requires the extensive capability of current measurement.
This problem can be addressed by using differential measurement techniques where
the resistance of the memristor is compared with other fixed resistors with different
resistances.
Observation 3.3: [Secure storage] Access to the memristors without the
knowledge of biasing condition will reveal µ-knowledge to an attacker, where µ
depends on the number of parameters required to correctly model operating cycles
of a given memristor.
In this protocol, we keep the memristors response to the input pulse (the
state of the memristor pi) as the secret shared between the prover and the verifier.
Based on device requirement R1 and R4, the attacker with single access may be
able to obtain whether a memristor is at HRS or LRS, but he won’t be able to
find the cycle-accurate state information of the memristor. He will need to access
the memristor an average of O(µ) times (assuming a linear model) to create the
programming model of the device.
An essential drawback of this protocol is that it requires the device to have
same programming cycles, i.e., the device must maintain the similar programming
behavior over different cycles. For a reliable application, we need to either reduce
such restrictions or provide proper error-correction mechanisms such as majority
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voting and fuzzy extractor algorithms[50] for a secure application. Helper data
in error correction can leak information, and therefore, such construction must be
carefully designed.
3.6 Single User Authentication Protocol II
Next, we present a protocol using the basic schemes of memristor-based secret shar-
ing for single-user authentication. We use a special access structure that computes
the XOR of two different physical properties, namely the input voltage and the re-
sistive state of a given memristor. The circuit is shown in Fig 3.3. was developed by
Shin et. al. [51] as a resistive computing primitive. The key operating principle of
this structure is simple. The resistive state of the output resistance RP is the XOR
of the applied voltage VX and the input resistance RY . Details of the operation of
this circuit are discussed in the next section.
3.6.1 Description of Protocol II
In this protocol, the prover and the verifier participate in one-time enrollment phase
that generates and share the secret using the key-generation algorithm KeyGen02.
For authentication, multiple rounds of interactive authentication (as presented in
table 3.2) is performed.
Assumptions: We assume that the verifier has an access structure M con-
taining `-three-transistor-two-memristor blocks of Figure 3.3 (where ` is the length
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of the provers key x. ` depends on the security parameter λ. During authentication,
the prover has access to the Vx terminal of M during the authentication phase.
Algorithm 3 RNG based Key Generation and Key Storage in Memristor




4: procedure h← KeySto1(x)
5: Sample y
$← Z`2
6: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do,
7: Configure the input resistance RY of M [i]
th block using the following rule
8: if y[i] = 0 then, RESET RY .
9: else SET RY .
10: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do,
11: Apply the control voltage Vx of M [i]
th block using the following rule:
12: if x[i] = 0 then, apply Vx = 0.
13: else Vx = VBL
14: Generate h, by reading the resistive state of control resistance Rp of the
M [i]th block using the following rule:
15: if Rp = LRS then, h[i] = 1
16: else h[i] = 0
17: return h
Enrollment: The protocol uses KeyGen02(1λ) to generate an `-bit secret x and
uses KeySto1(x) to generate `-bit h. The prover keeps x and the verifier keeps h.
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The verifier also keeps M . Finally, after sharing h and x, the access structure is
locked, i.e., the read/write mechanism for all RY in M is disabled.
Table 3.2: Single round interactive authentication for protocol II
Prover(x) Verifier(M,h)
— RESET all control resistors
(Rp) of M
— The control voltage Vx of
M [i]th block is applied using the
following rule:
a. If x[i] = 0, apply Vx = 0.
b. else Vx = VBL
— Generate h′ by reading the re-
sistive state of control resistance
Rp of the M [i]
th block using the
following rule:
a. If Rp = LRS, h
′[i] = 1.
b. else h′[i] = 0.
— If h = h′ accept, otherwise re-
ject.
This scenario is one of the most straightforward applications of Ito, Saito, and
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Nishizeki’s constructions of secret sharing between two parties[52]. For each bit
of provers’ private key, the verifier stores only the XORed value of this bit with
a random resistance. Therefore, the verifiers’ authentication server is resistant to
off-line dictionary attack. To get the provers private key, an attacker requires not
only the content of the authentication server but also a knowledge of the access
structure M used to generate h. To create a hardware dependent access structure,
the key storage procedure of protocol II can be updated as follows:
Assumption: Assume that there exists high variability in the fabrication
of the devices and no forming voltage is applied on the memristors in the access
structure.
Algorithm 4 Key Storage in Memristive Storage using random resistive states
1: procedure h← KeySto2(x)
2: The forming voltage Vform is applied to the control memristor Rps.
3: RESET all Rp
4: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do,
5: Apply the control voltage Vx of M [i]
th block using the following rule:
6: if x[i] = 0 then, apply Vx = 0.
7: else Vx = VBL
8: Generate h, by reading the resistive state of control resistance Rp of the
M [i]th block using the following rule:
a. If Rp = LRS, h[i] = 1.




The core component of this protocol is the three-transistor-two-memristor config-
uration for computing XOR value of a logical voltage value and a logical resistive
value. The circuit is given in Figure 3.3. For authentication with `-bit secret, `
parallel blocks of 3T-2M units are required.
Figure 3.3: 3T-2M circuit configuration for single user authentication Protocol II
During the key storage/enrollment phase of Protocol II, the access structure
for a 1-bit private key is created by turning on s1 and turning off s2 and choosing
proper Vx, Vp and Rp. During authentication phase, first resetting of Rp is performed
by keeping s1 off and s2 on and Vp = VRESET . Then the key evaluation is done by
turning on s1 and turning off s2. An example simulation of authentication using
this hardware is given at 3.8.
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3.6.3 Security Analysis
Protocol II defines a simple XOR-based scheme for key storage and authentication.
The weakness of this protocol is: it requires that the prover has some form of physical
access to the memristive structure M .
Theorem 3.4: The chance of randomly guessing the secret is 1/2`.
Proof: The Verifier (V) compares h′ = h, the attacker needs to guess the
voltages for the bit-stream y = h⊕ x′, where, x′[i] denotes the resistive state for
Rp of the i
th block. Since, this protocol only recognized only two resistive state
(i.e., LRS and HRS), the success of random guessing is 1/2|h| = 1/2`. Similarly, an
average of O(2`) attempts are required to extract the secret x.
Algorithm 3 assumes a random distribution of the resistances before the form-
ing process and uses this randomness to create a one-time pad for generating h.
This can lead to the secure erasure of the secret x by erasing h.
3.7 Multiple User Authentication
To address the problems regarding multi-user authentication, we propose to design
a Visual Cryptography inspired memristor based multi-user authentication scheme.
A small motivational example for 2-out-of-3-user authentication using memristor
based threshold detector circuit is given below to illustrate the key concepts.
Assume that an entity Alice wants to simultaneously authenticate three users
B1, B2, and B3. Alice chose a random key K, and for each bit of the key, for each
user, Alice randomly choose a row from the following matrix C0 and C1 using the
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given rules and gives the corresponding 3-bits to the users. The matrices are given
as [21]:












and the distribution rules are:
i If the ith-bit of the key is 0, distribute the rows of C0 to B1, B2, and B3.
ii If the ith-bit of the key is 1 distribute the rows of C1 to B1, B2, and B3.
Note that for a single user, it would be impossible to guess the key bit. For
authentication, Alice let any two or more users access the memristor for the duration
of three pulses. The users apply their keys to each pulse. The keys are taken through
an OR gate as shown in Fig 3.4. An ON pulse is used at a cycle if the result of the
OR gate is one. Otherwise, no pulse is applied. If the ith-bit of the key is zero, then
for only two of the cycles the users will give an ON pulse, but there will be no ON
pulse for one cycle. However, if the ith-bit is 1, there will be three ON pulses. As a
result, after the duration of three pulses, the device’s resistance should be lower if
the key was 1 and higher if the key was 0.
A threshold detector can easily detect this and reconstruct the key. This
scheme can easily be modified to an n-out-n or a k-out-of-n authentication system.
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One weakness of the above example is that to reconstruct a bit of the key; the users
do not necessarily need Alice. If any two of the valid users come together, they
can restore the bits. If we want a hardware dependent authentication, where the
participating device should also be a factor during authentication, this might cause
a collusion problem. However, this issue does not exist if Alice has some interference
in key generation.
3.7.1 Description of the Protocol
For multiple user authentications, we will assume an interactive protocol between
a multiple provers B and a verifier V . All the provers and the verifier has some
knowledge about a shared secret x. The secret is generated through a key-generation
procedure KeyGenM(1λ), where λ is a security parameter. The authentication
protocol responds with the outputs accept or reject after a successful run of the
protocol. Here we formally describe the simple key generation and distribution
procedure which is similar to the one proposed by Naor et al [21].
Assumptions: For the authentication scheme described below, we assume
that R1-R6 described at 3.2 holds. We also expect that the verifier owns the au-
thentication hardware and controls the bit-line voltage (VBL). The verifier also acts
as the dealer D that knows p (where (p[i]) is the number of ON pulses required for
pushing the resistance of the memristor M [i] from a fixed HRS state to the reference
resistance (Rin).
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Algorithm 5 Key Generation and Distribution for Multiple User Authentication




4: procedure (S1,S2, . . . ,Sk)← KeyDistM(x)
5: Consider a ground set G consisting of k elements g1, g2, ....gk. The subsets of
G with even cardinality are e1, e2, .., e2k−1 and odd cardinality are q1, q2, , q2k−1
6: Construct two Boolean matrices B0 and B1 of size k × 2k−1 such that,
B0[i, j] = 1 iff gi ∈ ej and B1[i, j] = 1 iff gi ∈ qj for i ∈ {1, . . . k} and
j ∈ {1 . . . 2k−1}
7: Construct collections ξ0 and ξ1 by permuting all the column of B0 and B1




10: for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k} do
11: if x[i] = 0 then Sj[i, :] = C0[j, :] . distribute the rows of C0.
12: else Sj[i, :] = C1[j, :] . distribute the rows of C1.
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Table 3.3: Single round interactive authentication for multiple prover, single verifier
Provers(S1,S2, . . . ,Sk) Verifier(M,x)
—RESET all memristors of M
— Set the bias point such that all
memristor requires p-ON pulses
to move to the LRS, where p is
the number of columns of B0,B1.
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . `}
for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . p}
Simultaneously apply all
S∗[i, j] on the U∗ gates at Figure
3.4
— If Vout = x then accept, else
reject.
Due to the fabrication variations, each memristor would have different write-
time, which will lead to different (but of the same order) values of pi for various
devices at a given VBL. Since the dealer/verifier owns the equipment, she knows
the value of pi for any given Ri. As different memristor requires different numbers
of ON pulses, additional 1s need to be padded in each row of C0 and C1. A more
straightforward solution to this problem is to precondition each memristor with this
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additional 1s. Before each round, the verifier can precondition each memristor with
precondition value y so that each requires the same number of extra ON pulses to
reach LRS as discussed in procedure ErrCorr. Another way is to use the block-length
defined constructs. Block length is the number of ones resulted by OR-ing all the
columns of C1. Therefore, the dealer can design block length adjusted matrices C
′
0
and C ′1 depending on the number of ON pulses required for a state transition and
follow KeyDistM to share a bit (xi) of the key x.
Algorithm 6 Extraction of Correct Precondition Values
1: procedure y← ErrCorr(k,M) . M is a memristive array of length `
2: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `} do
3: RESET M [i]
4: Apply k ON pulses on M[i]
5: READ M[i].
6: if M [i] = HRS then
7: Apply t-pulses to put M [i] in LRS
8: y[i] = t
9: else y[i] = 0
10: return y
To make a hardware dependent authentication scheme, the dealer can choose
smaller block length or pad less number of 1s at the end of C ′1 for some of the random
bits of the key X. Since the provers do not have access to the hardware, they do
not know the exact value of pi’s for a given M [i]. Therefore, the dealer can share a
0 by sharing contents of C ′1 for cases where C
′
1 is not correctly generated from C1.
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Thus, it would be impossible for k-users (or even all the users) to collude and guess
the secret key.
3.7.2 Hardware Design
For developing a memristor-based secret reconstruction and authentication circuit,
we need to extract the current state of a given device. It should be noted that
improper reading of a memristor cell with high bias voltage across the cell can
change its states, and therefore, the read operation should be done carefully. To
accomplish this, we have used a simple CMOS compatible differential sense amplifier.
The resistance of the device Rx is compared with an on-chip resistance Rin that has
a threshold resistance value. If Rx < Rin the circuit outputs 1, else it outputs a
zero. The basic circuit is shown in Figure 3.4 which can be used for reconstructing
the shared secret.
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Figure 3.4: Circuit for applying the pulsed input from k-users and the assisting
voltage-mode sense amplifier-buffer circuit for reconstructing the secret.
3.7.3 Security Analysis
The construction used for secret sharing in table 3.3 is a k-out-of-k scheme with the
security parameters m, r, α with m = 2k−1, α = 1/2k−1, and r = 2k−1!, where m is
the number of pixel in the a share for a single bit, α is the relative difference between
the weights in the representation of a ’0’ and a ’1’, and r is the size of collections
ξ0, ξ1 [21].
Key Collision and Contrast Note that, for the given scheme in procedure
KeyDistM(x), the number of columns of any matrices of the collection ξ0 that gen-
erates an output ’1’ when all the elements of the columns are “or”-ed is 2k−1 − 1,
while the number of columns of any matrices of the collection ξ1 that generates an
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output ’1’ when all the elements of the columns are “or”-ed is 2k−1 [21]. Therefore,
there exists a contrast difference in ξ0 and ξ1. This is because there is always a
column in C0 that is indexed by the empty set [21].
However, the number of ’0’ or ’1’ remains the same for any rows. Thus, the
keys will be indistinguishable for each share [21]. Any permutation of the columns
will return the same distribution because if we consider the rows as the subset of
the ground set of size 2k−1, every intersection of k− 1 rows and its complement will
be of size two [21].
Cheating and Secret Reconstruction by User Collusion A weak adver-
sarial model can be assumed from a group of dishonest participants in a k-out-of-n
secret sharing model. Such attack is defined as cheating where a group of unscrupu-
lous users uses fake shares to alter the secret that was distributed at the initial phase.
This is a typical attack scenario in visual cryptography-based secret sharing, and
there are several practical countermeasures proposed by Horng et al. [53]. Since we
have used visual cryptography for authentication purposes with the secret shared at
the initialization phase, cooperation between multiple dishonest users would create
a denial-of-service attack on the authentication system. If the dealer uses hardware
dependent scheme, fraudulent users cannot create a cheating attack or reconstruct
the secret by themselves since the dealer/verifier owns the hardware. Additionally,
for detecting such attacks, the dealer can put redundant information in each share
that constructs a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing with dealer/verifier and the prover.
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3.8 Simulations of the Proposed Designs
We have conducted experiments on the performance of the proposed circuit and
protocols and explored their reliability over physical and environmental variation.
For these experiments, we have used the Verilog-A model of memristors proposed
by Guan et al. [40]. This is a variability-aware memristor model that takes account
of the critical impact of temperature change and temporal variations [40]. We have
used PTM’s 65nm MOSFET models for designing the authentication unit. The
simulations are performed in HSPICE platform. For calculations presented in this
section, we have used the parameters listed in Table 3.4 and 3.6 and 3.7.
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Table 3.5: NMOS and PMOS parameters used for the simulations for the circuit












Vth0 (for all the NMOS) 0.423V
Vth0 (for all the PMOS) -0.365V
For our first experiment, we provide a simple demonstration of single user au-
thentication using Protocol II and the access structure shown in Figure 3.3. Here,
we assume that the access structure can contain a random resistive state as deter-
mined in the registration phase. For this experiment, we consider Bob the prover
has a binary string as a private key. We have demonstrated several consecutive
authentication attempts in Figure 3.5. Note that if Bob’s correct key is ‘0’ (or ‘1’),
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Alice (the verifier) will see an HRS or LRS in RP based on the random resistive state
of RY set at the enrollment phase. Therefore, it would be impossible to reconstruct
Bob’s actual key by Alice without tampering the access structure.
Table 3.6: Operating conditions used for the single-user authentication experiments
presented in Protocol II.
Parameter Name Value




Table 3.7: Operating conditions used for the multi-user authentication experiments
presented in this work.
Parameter Name Value
Clock frequency (fclk) 50MHz
V BL SET 1.8V
V WL SET 1.0V
V WL RESET 2.7V
V BL RESET 1.9V
R in 250kΩ
Next, we provide a simple 3-out-of-3 secret sharing based user authentication
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Figure 3.5: Simple demonstration of single user authentication. Here Bob’s private
key string is “1010” which he applies beginning at 500ns. Before the application
of each bit, Alice RESETs the corresponding output memristor RP . The bottom
two figures represent the changes in the resistive state of the output resistance in
two different cases. If the configuration resistance in the access structure (i.e., RY
) is locked at HRS in the enrollment phase (as shown in the third figure from the
top) then for Alice would observe a “LRS-HRS-LRS-HRS” pattern in the output
resistance RP , whereas, for RY locked in LRS, Alice would see “HRS-LRS-HRS-
LRS” pattern. Note that, using one access structure for multiple bits of secret share
can reveal information about the secret; therefore, each structure should be used for
one-bit of Bob’s key.
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using Protocol 3. For the given parameters, we find that it requires eight ON pulses
(i.e., SET operation) to move the device in question from a high resistive state to
the low resistive state. Therefore, after eight consecutive ON pulse to Rx, one would
observe logic 1 at Vout. Since we want Alice to reveal the secret by applying the final
ON pulse, a system with block-length of 7 would be required for doing multi-user
authentication. If we consider a 3-out-of-3 user authentication system, then using
the constructions provided in [22], we have C ′0 and C
′
1 respectively as:
C0 = {all the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 0
}
C1 = {all the matrices obtained by permuting the columns of
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
}
In Figure 3.6, we have shown how the verifier (Alice) verifies a 1 or 0 shared
to the participating entities.
3.9 Discussions
Apart from computationally-bound eavesdropper and random guessing attackers,
there are some other attacker models for the protocols proposed in this chapter,
such as attackers creating denial-of-service and side channel attacks.
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Figure 3.6: Simultaneous multi-user authentication using memristor based hard-
ware. Alice verifies a 1 and a 0 shared to the participating entities. The first pulse
from Alice is the READ pulse and the three subsequent pulses are for ensuring
balanced SET/RESET operation.
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state of the memristor devices by applying more currents to the memristors that
store the private key-related information so that when the legitimate user enters the
authentic key, the system will not be able to verify that.
Due to a lot of memristor devices in the authentication architecture, in single-
user authentication it may not be easy for Malice to launch this attack to a particular
victim unless she correctly identifies which set of memristor devices correspond to the
victim. However, Malice may succeed to attack random victims. To countermeasure
such attack, we can restrict user’s access to the memristor devices. Unfortunately,
this would lead to a denial of service attack in the authentication verifier side, and
like other authentication disabling mechanisms, such preventive measure eventually
would require intervention from the verifier. Therefore, one of the weaknesses of
these protocols comes from DoS attacks.
However, for multiple user authentications providing a train of 1’s at user
input will create a practical denial of service attack for all k users. A simple finite
state machine consisting one D-flip flop and an AND gate can be placed at each
user terminal to detect such series of 1s. for k-users the flip-flops can be reset after
each cycle along with the memristors.
Side channel attacks This is a group of influential attacks where Malice target
the vulnerabilities in the hardware implementation of the security primitives and
protocols. By measuring the side channel information (such as power, timing, and
EM emission) during system’s execution, secret information of the system can be
revealed.
We are not aware of any side channel attacks to memristor based systems. But
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should such attacks emerge, most of the existing countermeasures (such as careful
engineering, using redundancy, design obfuscation, and so on) should be applicable.
Finally, the effectiveness of the protocols will also depend on private-key col-
lision (false negative) and false positive alarms. False negative refers to the case
when different passwords are deemed to be authentic for one user. This is a prob-
lem of password/secret selection. One standard solution is to add salt as the UNIX
password management system does. When users choose their passwords, the ver-
ifier system (Alice) can append/combine certain unique data to the user selected
pulse train. This will ensure that uniqueness of each user’s password. However,
the system can use memristor to store the salt data associated with each user.
It should be noted that one can try to replicate single-user authentication using
PRNGs and known seeds. However, memristors are giving a unique advantage of
hardware-dependent hashing for key storage in both cases.
False positive alarms happen when an authentic private key is declined. It is
more of reliability of the proposed protocols than security breaches. For the pro-
tocols discussed in this chapter, any of the generated response of the memristive
authenticator is entirely dependent on the choice of bias-voltage and the hardware
used. Therefore, the reliability of the protocols will be dependent on the cycle ac-
curate performance of the authentication unit over time. Here, we have analyzed
the common causes for which an authentication unit will fail to produce the correct
response. It should be noted that these weaknesses are mostly due to the imperfect
operating conditions of memristor and by addressing these issues, one can develop
reliable authentication mechanisms for resistive memory platforms. Primary con-
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cerns for the reliability of the proposed protocols are listed below:
1. Unbalanced Set-Reset: The resistive levels of the memristor devices
can change due to unbalanced set-reset pulses over a long period of programming
cycles, and hence, one of the major sources of error in the authentication protocols
can be an unbalanced set-reset cycle. If the RESET pulse pulls up the resistance
more than the previous SET pulses, then the overall resistance of the HRS will drift
away with time. An example of this effect is illustrated in Fig.3.7 where we show
that due to unbalanced reset, the resistance of the memristor drifts to HRS over
multiple cycles. For proper operation of the authentication mechanism shown in
Fig 6.after authentication Alice still memristor to apply two consecutive SET pulses











1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2



































Figure 3.7: Example of SET/RESET unbalance for the circuit given in Fig. 3.4.
The top plot shows the typical pulsed programming for a memristive device. The
second figure (middle one) lists the changes in a memristor resistance for a stable
SET/RESET condition. The plot at the bottom shows the effect of unbalanced
biasing where the SET voltage is lowered by 12mV than the previous balanced
condition and the RESET voltage is kept the same as before.
To examine the reliability of the circuit, we define a parameter called SET/RESET
mismatch as the following: Let us assume that for a given pure LRS it takes a ν0
volts pulse with τns duration to RESET it to a pure/defined HRS. We define τ as
the ideal reset time. Now, a mismatch can be quantified as the difference between
the ideal reset time (τ) and the actual reset time τ ′ while the bias ν0 remains con-
stant. We can find out the reliability of a circuit (in our case the authenticator
unit) by measuring the number of reliable operations it performs before erroneous
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Figure 3.8: SET/RESET mismatch (in ns) vs number of reliable cycles for fast(15
ns) RESET pulse
bit flip is seen at the output (Vout) due to SET/RESET mismatch. In Figure 3.8,
we have shown the number of reliable operation that can be performed with the
authenticator unit as the SET/RESET mismatch increases.
To fight error from unbalanced SET/RESET, the authenticator can perform
a full SET/RESET operation after every authentication and RESET operation and
verify whether the total number of pulses for a SET remains constant. Another error
correction technique is, if the authenticator sees the loss/gain of 1 pulse for SET
operation after n′ operation, then a correction factor 1 can be subtracted/added to
the preconditioning or the hashed value. However, after a bit flip is observed, the
best solution would be to recalibrate the device using a reference resistance. It can
be seen that with fast reset the number of reliable operations before reset correction
is small. Therefore, slower reset with longer pulses and a lower bias voltage is
preferable to the protocols described in this work.
2. Temperature dependence of filament formation: Experimental evi-
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dence report that the conductive filament formation in a given device is dependent
on the device temperature[40]. This can also be seen from equations 2.4 and 2.5. A
device that goes through balanced SET/RESET is more reliable with the variance
in temperature than the one having an unbalanced operation. Therefore maintain-
ing proper operating temperature for the circuit with balanced SET/RESET will
be very critical for the reliable operation of the proposed protocols. Changes in the
operating temperature will create unreliable operation similar to unbalanced SET-
RESET. Therefore, techniques such as a full SET/RESET operation after every
authentication, RESET and verify before authentication, and simple error correc-
tion as discussed at the previous paragraph etc. will be helpful in addressing issues
arising from temperature variation.
3. Spatial variations in filament formation and random filament for-
mation: During SET/RESET process lattice temperature of the filament increases
abruptly which gives rise to random non-uniform filament generation. This non-
uniformness of filament generation will introduce random fluctuations resistive val-
ues during the intermediate states. Overall this would result in cycle-to-cycle write
time variability in the device. To reduce this cycle-to-cycle write-time variability,
one can use the same techniques discussed for unbiased SET/ RESET case.
4. Noise: The primary feature of our proposed designs are to use the bias
dependent write-time variability. However, noise in the writing signal can cause
cycle-to-cycle variations in the number of pulses required for performing a given
write. Noise on the SET or RESET line can profoundly impact the reliability of the
circuit, therefore; care should be taken to remove the bit-line noise.
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5. Aging: A proper aging model of memristors is still elusive. However, with
aging, the response of the circuit would certainly change, and correct aging model
and error correction mechanism are required to combat this phenomenon.
Here we point out that environment variations such as temperature, noise,
and device aging may all create false positive alarms. We do not expect this to
be a serious problem because we do authentication at the cycle-accurate level, not
do the matching in the analog domain. Furthermore, like most of the biometric
authentication schemes (such as fingerprint or face recognition), it is possible to
authenticate the key with a non-perfect match. That is, we do not need to match
every pulse in the pulse train to authentic the key.
We have also fabricated the memristors for experimenting with the ideas pre-
sented in this chapter. The details of the fabricated devices are given in chapter 6.
Figure 6.2 provides the physical view along with the dimensions of the memristors
and Figure 6.3 provides the I-V characteristics of the fabricated memristor.
In summary, when we assume that an outside attacker is only allowed to
provide pulse train as the key for authentication and can measure the state changes
at a fixed time during the cycles, the attacker can gain very little information, and
our user authentication protocols will be stable and secure. However, if the attacker
gains physical access to the memristors that we use to store user’s private key-




Non-volatile memory based devices and circuits are monotonic. Exploiting this
monotonicity can be useful in designing secure circuits and security protocols. In
this work, we have connected the additive and monotonic nature of memristor de-
vices with secret sharing based user authentication ideas. We have reported the
designed protocol and the necessary circuits required for single and multiple user
authentications using memristor based hardware. These robust, hardware depen-
dent user authentication schemes can be useful in developing security primitives in
the extremely resource-constrained IoT applications.
79
Chapter 4: Authentication Using Voltage Over-scaling
4.1 Introduction
The design of digital circuits and systems are focused on the deterministic results,
i.e., for the same inputs, any design will yield the same output. As we push the
boundaries of power efficiency, we are introducing the effects of analog nature of
the circuit components involved in the computation. In the field of approximate
computing, one of the common power reduction techniques is voltage over-scaling
(VOS). In VOS, the digital circuit used for computation is operated under the nom-
inal voltage, which guarantees correct output for all input conditions under any
given operating environment. Since the dynamic power consumed in a VLSI chip
is squarely proportional, and static power is proportional the operating voltage, re-
ducing the operating voltage under the prescribed margin can result in considerable
power savings. However, the effect of this voltage over-scaling will be translated
into errors generated during a computation. In this chapter, we examine how to
use voltage over-scaling to exacerbate the effects of process variation and extract
information regarding this variation that can be used for security purposes.
The physical variations have already been widely utilized for security applica-
tions in the form of physically unclonable function (PUF). However, PUF is costly
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regarding hardware and power consumption, bringing an obstacle for its widespread
usage in IoT. By contrast, our proposed lightweight authentication protocol does
not require any additional hardware in the low power Things. In this chapter, our
main contributions are as follows:
1. We demonstrate that voltage over-scaling based computing leaves a process
variation dependent device signature in the approximate results.
2. Binding this process variation dependent device signature with basic key based
authentication schemes; we propose a simple authentication mechanism VOLtA:
Voltage Over-scaling Based Lightweight Authentication, and perform a secu-
rity analysis of is protocols.
3. Our work shows that approximate computing can impact security, especially
identification and de-anonymization of users and devices.
4.2 Voltage over-scaling: Backgrounds
Variations in the manufacturing process, supply voltage and temperature (PVT)
have a major impact on the performance and reliability of a computation performed
by an integrated circuit. Fluctuations in PVT affects the time required for a gate
to switch to the correct state and thus creates timing errors in the output result.
The general trend of digital design is to consider all the corner cases and optimize
the design in a way so that fluctuations in PVT have no (or minimal) effect on the
output under normal operating conditions.
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As the size of the transistor reduces, the effect of process variation becomes
a critical issue in digital design. These variations come from the collective factors
such as imperfection of the manufacturing process, random dopant fluctuation, and
variation in the gate oxide thickness, etc. As the transistor size shrinks, the standard
deviation of threshold voltage variation increases, since it is proportional to the




where A∆Vt is characterizing matching parameter for any given process. This vari-
ation in Vt will have a direct consequence in the delay of a CMOS gate which can





where α and β are fitting parameters for a gate and the given process. There-
fore, to maintain the timing correctness, static timing analysis of a given design
is performed on the process corners. The timing analysis ensures that for a given
operating condition, all paths meet the timing requirements to produce correct re-
sults irrespective of the input vectors. Scaling VDD from the predefined operating
voltage creates large timing errors and degrades the output quality. However, VDD
scaling can offer great saving is energy budget, and therefore, voltage over-scaling-
based approximate computation received significant research attention in the last
decade[55, 56, 57].
From equation 4.2 it is evident that with voltage over-scaling and transistor
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shrinking, underlying device signature due to process variation manifests itself more
prominently in the delay output. If proper correction mechanism is not applied,
this variation will cause errors in the output. If VDD and other operating conditions
remain fixed, the error generated by a computational unit due to VOS will retain
information about the process variation. Since process variation is a random process,
by profiling this error, one can distinguish the computational unit and generate a
unique device signature for the circuit.
4.3 Errors in an Approximated Circuit
To understand the effect of process variation in voltage over-scaling, we have studied
the error profiles generated by adders. Venkatesan et al. have provided process
variation independent error profiles for Ripple Carry Adders (RCA), Carry Look-
ahead Adders (CLA) and Han-Carlson Adder (HCA)[57]. It was found that the
error probability increases as the number of critical paths that fail to meet the
timing constraint increase[57]. Therefore, with the presence of randomness in the
manufacturing process, the variations in the transistors in the critical paths will
have a significant contribution to the errors produced by the adders.
Among the adders, it was found that Han-Carlson adder fares the poorest
regarding producing correct result with voltage over-scaling. RCA performs better
than HCA and the probability of error increases slowly with the length of the adder
[57]. CLA performs best among these three adders. If one wants to extract fabrica-
tion variation related information, she needs to be careful on the choice of circuits.
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For example, HCA can suppress the variation dependent errors with the errors due
to scaling effects, and CLA can repress impact of process variation due to its timing
forgiving nature. Therefore, for our discussions, we have used RCA that has the
potential to preserve process variation related artifacts.
4.3.1 Error Modeling
If a given circuit is operated with a clock period that is less than the maximum
delay produced by the circuit, then the circuit output becomes a function of current
and previous input values [57]. Therefore, the output data in a circuit under VOS
not only is a function of process variations but also a function of the input values
applied to the circuit. Hence, for a combinational adder with two operands x and
y, we can write the current output zi of a voltage over-scaled adder as a function of
current inputs xi, yi, and previous inputs xi−1,yi−1. Therefore,
zi = f(xi,yi,xi−1,yi−1) (4.3)
where f() defines a process variation dependent addition. This dependence on
previous inputs can cause cascading errors in the output. Therefore, to correctly
predict the output of a voltage over-scaled adder, one (say Alice) can take the
following measures.
1. Save the output data for the set of input patterns that will be used on that
circuit. For example, if an only a set SI containing n-input pattern will be
used for processing in a given adder, then Alice needs to save outputs for all
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the combination of the pattern resulting from SI . This would reveal the partial
behavior of the circuit for a subset of input data.
2. Profile the adder for all possible input patterns. For profiling the adder, one
not only needs to consider all possible current input values but also requires
previous input values. Therefore, a correct profile of an n-bit voltage over-
scaled adder would consist a table of entries comprised all possible current
input value times all possible input values in the previous step. This would
amount to 22n × 22n = 24n entries of the input values and the corresponding
output values. Since all the additions are not incorrect and dependent on the
previous values, one can significantly reduce the size of the profile by strong
only the cases where the adders provide inaccurate results.
3. Use a delay-based graphical model to learn the properties of the adder. Since
Alice has the adder, she can profile the device, and use this profile to create a
conditional probability table for a Bayesian network.
Our construct of using process dependent delay information for generating
responses to random challenges requires the verifier have access to the exact
model of the device. Given the access to a large number of input-output of the
adder, a verifier can build a model of the adder using Probably Approximately
Correct (PAC) learning model in polynomial time. We can prove that such




From the discussions above, we are stating the following requirements to design
authentication protocols using a voltage over-scaling based VLSI system. The com-
puting unit (i.e., the adder) must fulfill theses requirements for ensuring a secure
authentication.
R1 Voltage over-scaling can produce process variation dependent errors in the
computing unit.
R2 Errors produced due to voltage over-scaling are not random noise but repro-
ducible information since they merely reveal the output of the circuit at a
lower operating voltage.
R3 If one has access to the input and output ports of this circuit, he can adequately
model the behavior the computation performed by this unit.
R4 Such model discussed in R3 would be unique for each computational unit since
the manufacturing-dependent process variations are random in nature
.
4.4 Experimental Demonstration
To understand the effects of voltage-over-scaling on processed data, we have simu-
lated simple image processing example using RCA to analyze that effect of process
variations, voltage variations, and temperature. We have performed our simulations
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Figure 4.1: 8-bit-ripple carry adder.
in HSpice platform using the FreePDK 45nm libraries[59]. To introduce process
variation in our design, we have used 200 modified NMOS and PMOS models with
variable threshold voltages. Gaussian distribution with a ±7.5% standard variation
is assumed for the variation of the threshold voltages. This modified NMOS and
PMOS transistor models are randomly chosen to build 100 different versions of each
standard cell in the FreePDK 45nm library. We have designed our digital circuits in
Verilog and synthesize them using the Cadence Virtuoso RT compiler. The synthe-
sized design is then converted into an HSpice netlist with standard cells randomly
chosen from our modified library.
We present a simple image processing application based on the superimposition
of two images under general operating conditions and compare their results. The
image processing application superimposition reads the 8-bit values stored at every
pixel location for any two given image and add the values. The processing is first
done on an accurate adder and then on two voltage over-scaled ripple-carry adders
(as shown in 4.1) with process variations.
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(b) (c)(a)
Figure 4.2: An example of superimposing two images. We have used two grayscale
images (a) trees and (b) snowflakes from MATLAB library to generate the super-
imposed image (c) Snowfall.
From visual observation of Figure 4.3(a), 4.3(b) and 4.3(c), one can clearly
notice the effect of voltage over-scaling in this simple image processing application.
Figure 4.3(b) and 4.3(c) are somewhat distinguishable if an observer pays close
attention. We generate the error patterns by calculating the difference between
each pixel value in the approximated result and the correct result. Although it is
difficult to distinguish the difference between the error patterns shown in Figure
4.3(d) and 4.3(e), if we plot their differences as done in Figure 4.3(f), one can notice




Figure 4.3: An example of the effect of process variations in voltage over-scaling
based computation. In (a) the grayscale image Snowfall is computed using trees
and snowflakes without voltage over-scaling using vdd = 1V ; in (b) and (c) the
image is computed under voltage over-scaling using vdd = 0.4V with two adders
which are identical in every aspect, except the process variation of the transistors;
(d) and (e) shows the error pattern found in the figure (b) and (c). This error
pattern shows the deviations for each adder from the correct image. Subfigure (f)
shows the difference between the two error pattern (d) and (e). The source images
were downsized to 52× 40 pixels for reducing computation time.
If we plot the histogram of the Euclidean distances between the Figures 4.3(a),
4.3(b) and 4.3(a),4.3(c) (as done in Figure 4.4) then we can see some interesting
results on the error pattern. It can be noted that the peaks of this histograms
mainly appears at 2,4,8,16,32,64, which suggests that most of these errors in the
approximated results come from a single bit-errors. Furthermore, the peaks at
1,2,4,8,16 are higher in most cases, revealing the fact that for these two adders most
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of the errors are in the LSBs.
















Figure 4.4: A histogram of the Euclidian distances (a) between the figures 4.3(a)
and 4.3(b); (b) between the figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(c); between the figures 4.3(b)
and 4.3(c). The x-axis in the sub-figures represents bins of all the possible distance
values from 1-128, and the y-axis in the sub-figures represents the number of pixels
(in the two corresponding computation of Snowfall images) that share the same
distance values.
4.5 Simple Authentication Protocol Using Voltage Overscaling
4.5.1 Notations
In this chapter, the set of integers modulo an integer q ≥ 1 is denoted by Zq.
Matrices, vectors single elements over Zq are represented by consecutively upper case
bold letter, lower case bold letters and lower case letters such as X, x and x. For a
vector x, the length of the vector is denoted by |x|, ith element is represented by x[i]
and wt(x) denotes the Hamming weight (i.e., the number of indices for which x[i] 6= 0
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) of the vector x. The Hamming distance between two binary matrices are denoted
by hd(A,B) (i.e., the number of indices for which A[i][j] 6= B[i][j]). Concatenation
of two vectors are represented with || symbol. c $← {x ∈ Z} represents a random
sampling of x. We denote probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms with
upper case calligraphic alphabets such as A. Therefore, if A is probabilistic, then
for any input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ there exists a polynomial p(.) such that the computation
of a terminates in at most p(|x|) steps.
4.5.2 Description of the Protocol
For single user authentication, we will assume an interactive protocol between a
single prover P and a verifier V . Both the prover and the verifier has some knowledge
about a shared secret x. The secret is generate through a key-generation procedure
KeyGenV OLtA(1λ),where λ is a security parameter. The authentication protocol
responds with the outputs accept or reject after a successful run of the protocol.
Assumptions: Assuming that one has access to hardware that satisfies the re-
quirements R1-R4 presented in section 4.3.2. This authentication protocol assumes
that the prover has a voltage over-scaled computation unit (H) that generates pro-
cess dependent errors. The verifier either knows the correct model or profile (M) to
simulate the computation unit.
Algorithm 7 RNG based Key Generation for Voltage Overscaling based
authentication







Enrollment: The prover and the verifier uses the key generation procedure
KeyGenV OLtA to generate secrets x1,x2. ε is the predetermined error threshold
for the authentication.
Table 4.1: Single round interactive authentication VOLtA




Calculate L = H(R,x1) = R + x1 us-
ing the adder and then calculate
z = L⊕ x2 = (R + x1)⊕ x2
z−→
Calculate z′ = M(R,x1) ⊕ x2. If
distance (z′, z) ≤ ε accept.
Note that, the distance in the protocol can be measured by standard distance
measurement functions such as Hamming distance or Euclidean distance. Also, with
multiple keys, the verifier can authenticate numerous users using the same device.
Moreover, the verifier can verify the prover over different devices are given that
verifier knows the correct model of those devices.
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4.6 Evaluation of the Protocol
For our discussions on threat models and attacks, we assume that Alice tries to
authenticate Bob over an untrusted channel where Malice performs the following
attacks to obtain the security keys or being erroneously recognized as Bob. Below
we discuss the potential attacks on VOLtA.
This is a simple two-factor authentication scheme, which requires knowledge of
both the secret was known (i.e., key x1,x2) and the secret possessed (i.e., properties
of the voltage over-scaled adder). To prove the effectiveness of our proposed VOLtA,
we start from analyzing the potential weakness, for the case when we have a perfect
adder. If the adder is perfect when calculating L, this protocol is not secure. Assume
the following scenario: the malicious attacker Malice is pretending to be Alice, and
she wants to resolve Bobs key x1,x2 by sending some messages R and receiving the
corresponding z from Bob. Then she will apply eavesdropping and bit manipulation
techniques to recover the key.
However, when applying the voltage over-scaling approach, the addition will
become non-deterministic because the physical variations will affect the arithmetic
result as discussed in section 4.3. Therefore, the result of M(R,x1) cannot be
accurately predicted. As a result, the bitwise attacking scenario fails. Overall, for
the security of this protocol, the uncertainty of the calculation in the arithmetic
function needs to be guaranteed.
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4.6.1 Random Guessing Attack
The most straightforward attack that an adversary can perform is on the authenti-
cation protocol is to try and randomly guess the authentication keys. To accomplish
this attack, Malice tries to imitate Bob and responds to Alices query with a random
guess z′.
The security of VOLtA is tied not only to the key x1,x2 but also the property
of the approximate adder. Since Malice neither has information about the key
nor about the hardware properties, the success rate of such attacks exponentially
decreases with the increase in the number of bits in the security keys and with the
increase in the uncertainty of the results produced by the adder.
4.6.2 Eavesdropping Attack
For eavesdropping attack, Malice eavesdrop on some communications between Alice
and Bob and records Bobs response to each challenge from Alice. Later, for a known
query of Alice, Malice can answer correctly using her records.
Alice sending random string R each time can easily thwart such attacks be-
cause in that scenario response calculated by Bob will be different for different cases.
Since Alice knows the correct model of Bobs circuit, she can send random string




Man-in-the-middle attack constitutes the case where Malice pretends as Alice and
communicates with Bob. Malice sends random authentication strings to Bob and
collects his response. This attack would be difficult to perform if Bob has some
knowledge about the input sent by Alice. But this would violate the requirement of
randomized string to prevent other attacks. However, our authentication mechanism
will succumb to a MITM attack that queries Bob with a correct challenge, learn it
and give Alice the response.
4.6.4 Compromised key
One of the most active attacks on these protocols is the situation where the key x1,x2
and the model M is leaked to an attacker. Since this case breaks the fundamental
Kerckhoffs’s principle, both the protocols will fail in the face of such attacks.
Therefore, encryption techniques need to be applied to protect Alices database
to ensure the security of the keys and models. It should be noted that this would
provide security in the case when the key K is compromised because it is a two-factor
authentication protocol where the property of the adder is unknown to the attacker.
Therefore, without having the device of the model of the device, the attacker would
still have to resort to random guessing or other attacks to resolve a correct response.
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4.6.5 Learning-based attack
This attack is a combination of eavesdropping attack and learning attacks. Malice
eavesdrop on the communication during authentication and with the challenge and
response records, Malice models the voltage over-scaled approximate adder using a
learning model. Thus, Malice can create a delay based graphical model for the adder
with partial observables. Malice can estimate a conditional probability table, and
the chance of success in getting the model for the adder will increase the number
of trials that Malice can perform. However, the output of the adder is XORed with
x2, and therefore such attacks will be difficult to perform without the knowledge
about x2.
4.6.6 Side-channel attack
One of the most common side channel attacking techniques for encryption is static
or differential power analysis. Researchers have shown that the power analysis can
severely reduce the security of Ring Oscillator PUF, which is a well-known secure
primitive for key storage and authentication. However, our proposed voltage over-
scaling is more resistant to side channel attack because the arithmetic units are
working under much lower voltage. As we mentioned before, the dynamic power
consumed in a VLSI chip is squarely proportional to the supply voltage, the power
consumption during authentication process will be very low, making it difficult to
capture accurate power consumption. Since the adder does not generate correct
result, even though the attacker can measure the exact power consumption, he
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cannot apply the model of an accurate adder for regression. The real model M is
hidden in the process variations.
4.7 Experiments and Discussions
We have simulated the basic building blocks of the authentication protocol to an-
alyze that effect of process variations, voltage variations, and temperature, and
evaluate the performances of the protocols under general operating conditions. We
have performed our simulations in HSpice platform using the FreePDK 45nm li-
braries. To introduce process variation in our design, we have used 200 modified
NMOS and PMOS models with variable threshold voltages. Gaussian distribution
with a ±7.5% standard variation is assumed for the variation of the threshold volt-
ages. This modified NMOS and PMOS transistor models are randomly chosen to
build 100 different versions of each standard cell in the FreePDK 45nm library. We
have designed our digital circuits in Verilog and synthesize them using the Cadence
Virtuoso RT compiler. The synthesized design is then converted into an HSpice
netlist with standard cells randomly chosen from our modified library.
As our authentication protocol is based on addition performed in a voltage
over-scaled system, we have simulated simple 8-bit ripple carry adder for our analysis
presented in this work. This choice is justified in section 4.3.2. All the output bits of
the adder are fed into edge-triggered D-flip-flop to extract correct output bit values
in each clock cycles.
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Table 4.2: Parameters used for simulations in this chapter
Parameter Name Value(s)
Supply voltage (VDD) 0.4V/0.45V/1V
NMOS threshold voltage (Vtn) 0.322± 0.02415V
PMOS threshold voltage (Vtp) −0.302± 0.02265V
Operating temperature (T) 25◦C
Clock Period (Tclk) 1ns
4.7.1 Uniqueness & the Effect of Process Variation
In this section, first, we will validate the requirements presented in section 4.3.2. For
our experiments, we have used eight adders generated from a process variation-aware
45nm process. Our experiment at VDD=0.4V shows that the results generated
from voltage over-scaled adders contain errors. To understand the uniqueness of
each approximate adder regarding these errors, we evaluate the variations using the
following metrics:
I The pairwise Hamming distance of results between adder i and adder j. We
used a 3670-byte random input sequence related to the image processing ap-
plication discussed later. For each adder, we collect the results on each clock
cycle and concatenate all the results to create the complete output bit-stream
generated by the adder. Then, we calculate the pairwise Hamming distance in
of these output bit-streams. We divide the Hamming distance with the length
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of the bit-stream and report the result in percent in Table 4.3.




|result(i, l)− result(j, l)|
N
(4.4)
where N is the size of the output in bytes. The result is shown in Table 4.4.
Metric I, the Hamming Distance, is widely used to measure the difference
between two binary bit-streams. However, it omits the bit orders. For example, the
Hamming distance between the pair (00001, 00011) and a pair (00001,10001) are
all 1. Therefore, we introduce the second metric to have a measure of the average
numerical difference between the values represented by 8-bit outputs of every two
adders. Both Table 4.3 and 4.4 are symmetric since for our measures distance(i,j)=
distance(j,i).
In both Table 4.3 and 4.4, A1 represents the results from an exact adder. From
the first rows of Table 4.3, we can notice that there are about 20% bit flips in the
outputs of the voltage over-scaled adders. This provides experimental justification of
requirement R1 (discussed in section 4.3.2). From the rows and columns of Table 4.3,
it is evident that there is a significant difference in the output of two different voltage
over-scaled adders. This justifies R4. Note that R2 is also justifiable since we are
not introducing any noise or fault in the device, but we are merely resorting to the
analog nature of the device to get information about process variation. Moreover,
from table 4.4, it is evident that there is a significant average difference between the
numerical results produced from each adder.
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Table 4.3: Pairwise hamming distance (in percent)
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
A1 0 18.82 18.24 18.0 19.4 18.4 18.3 17.52
A2 18.82 0 5.36 5.21 5.67 5.65 3.89 5.39
A3 18.24 5.36 0 4.62 5.98 5.11 5 6.79
A4 18.0 5.21 4.62 0 5.73 3.53 4.13 6.44
A5 19.4 5.67 5.98 5.73 0 6.04 5.59 6.28
A6 18.4 5.65 5.11 3.53 6.04 0 4.96 6.64
A7 18.3 3.89 5 4.13 5.59 4.96 0 5.41
A8 17.52 5.39 6.79 6.44 6.28 6.64 5.41 0
4.7.2 Effect of Variations in Supply Voltage
The proposed authentication protocol is based on the key concept of voltage over-
scaling and the errors it produces. Therefore, variations in supply voltage will cause
reliability issues for the proposed design. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure
voltage supply with a minimal amount of noise for proper implementation of the
protocol. In Figure 4.5, we have plotted the response of voltage over-scaled adders
at 0.45V. This is a bit higher voltage than the one used for the results reported
in Table 4.3. It can be noted that as the voltage increases the overall Hamming
distance decrease, which represents the eventual convergence of all the adders to the
correct output at sufficiently higher voltage.
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Table 4.4: Pairwise average numerical difference between the output from the devices
at 0.4V
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
A1 0 12.01 14.64 16.11 12.30 14.13 12.13 13.25
A2 12.01 0 9.04 12.30 8.03 9.19 8.08 8.97
A3 14.64 9.04 0 8.43 9.03 7.24 9.07 11.13
A4 16.11 12.30 8.43 0 10.68 8.58 8.88 11.13
A5 12.30 8.03 9.03 10.68 0 6.01 6.51 9.45
A6 14.13 9.19 7.24 8.58 6.01 0 8.11 8.89
A7 12.13 8.08 9.07 8.88 6.51 8.11 0 8.47
A8 13.25 8.97 11.13 11.13 9.45 8.89 8.47 0
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Figure 4.5: Hamming distance (in percent) between devices at 0.45V . Here 1 repre-
sents a correct adder (A1) and 2-6 represents voltage over-scaled approximate adders
(A2-A6).
4.7.3 Effect of Variations in Temperature
Variations in operating temperature can also affect the protocols. To understand the
effect of temperature, we have calculated the percentage Hamming distance between
the results of the same adder at different temperatures as shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Temperature dependent bit flips for two different adders. The distance is
calculated from the results produced at T=25◦C. The blue (dark) line represents the
temperature dependent bit-flip for adder A2 and the yellow (light) line represents
the adder A3.
We find that ±5 degree variations result in less than 1% bit-flips. Therefore,
by carefully calibrating the threshold of error tolerance ε of the protocols, one can
negate the effects of minor temperature variations.
4.7.4 Mitigating Reliability Issues
Noise due to environmental variations can cause deviation from the expected result
in a voltage over a scaled circuit. However, taking majority votes in multiple reading
with the same challenge can reduce error due to environmental variations. Hence
in the small error case, suppose that the voltage overscaled device A produces the
expected response x with probability 0.9 over the choice of a challenge c. Then we
can amplify this probability to 1/(10n) by making 10logn repetitions and take the
majority vote. In this way, we can correctly recover all of the bits of x with high
probability.
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Another way of mitigating reliability issues due to environmental variation
is to authenticate using multiple challenge-response pairs. Assume that there is
an interchip variation τ exists between two given adder. τ is defined to be the
probability that for a given random challenge c, the response of the two adders at
VOS-limit would be different. Furthermore, let us quantify the noise as µ, where µ
represents the probability that for a given challenge the response would be different
for the δ change in environmental condition. Then, the probability that at least








τ i(1− τ)k−i (4.5)



















(1− a))(1−N(1− b)) (4.7)
Therefore, we can see that using multiple sets of CRPs for authentication; we can
guarantee successful authentication over environmental variations.
4.7.5 Deanonymization Issues
It should be noted that by profiling the input patterns of a voltage over-scaled circuit,
one could easily deanonymize the approximate circuit later based on the physical
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variations. This exposes a critical flaw in voltage over-scaling-based approximate
computing. Therefore, the anonymity of the approximate devices should also be
thoroughly studied. This work can be considered a step towards such analysis.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we introduce VOLtA, a voltage over-scaling based user authenti-
cation scheme that uses the random physical variation of a VLSI system as a key
for authentication of IoT nodes. VOLtA profiles the hardware used for computa-
tion in a reduced voltage operation and uses the underlying hardware fingerprint for
authentication purposes. This authentication protocol requires no additional hard-
ware on the claimant side to implement. This lightweight protocol can be useful
in IoT applications where the interconnected Things face extreme power, cost and
area constraints.
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Chapter 5: Signal Authentication and Spoofing Detection Using Hard-
ware Oscillators
5.1 Introduction
The progress towards the Internet of Things (IoT) is highly dependent on the secure
and successful integration of a trusted and robust geospatial localization and clock
synchronization mechanism for Things across a large distributed network. Cur-
rently, both these functions are predominantly provided by the Global Positioning
System (GPS). As a result, in today’s world, GPS receivers have become a ubiq-
uitous component in embedded systems: from the smart-phones and smart devices
to automated vehicles and Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) in the electric grid.
However, this pervasive nature of GPS receivers in current and next-generation
smart Things necessitates a thorough study of their security vulnerabilities and
corresponding countermeasures.
Recently, there have been several demonstrations of weaknesses and vulnera-
bilities of GPS signals and GPS receivers [61, 62, 63, 64, 65]. It has been argued
that the future of navigation is crucially dependent on defending spoofing attacks
on global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals such as GPS. Moreover, the
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prevailing trend in IoT application designs is to use the civilian GPS signals, these
signals are broadcast without encryption, and several practical demonstrations of
spoofing mechanisms have been documented in the literature [61, 62, 63, 65]. Most
of the analysis on GPS spoofing is directed towards the spoofing of position data.
However, GPS system is also used for large area clock synchronization, and there-
fore, attacks on GPS signals can impact networked infrastructure where accurate
timekeeping is essential. For example, Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) used in
the electrical power system synchronize themselves using GPS signals, and an attack
on this synchronization can induce failures in the power system across a wide area
[66].
Along with research on potential attacks, several authentication and anti-
spoofing techniques for GNSS signals have been developed in recent years. These
techniques can be broadly categorized as signal and data-level authentication. For
signal authentication, received signal characteristics of the civilian signal may be ver-
ified against encrypted GPS transmissions. Additionally, the plane-of-polarization
and angle-of-arrival can be measured to validate the signal as well. Data-level tech-
niques are based on authentication of the received data with reference to a-priori
knowledge of position or authentication using corroborative localization and tim-
ing sources. These methods have been shown to be effective; however, they are
not usually used in the commercial GPS receivers due to implementation cost[64].
Moreover, the accuracy, computational and power efficiency, security against so-
phisticated attacks and real-time performance of these approaches are still areas of
active research.
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In this chapter, we present a data-level authentication mechanism for GNSS
signals that rely on intrinsic hardware properties of a free-running crystal oscillator.
Since the free-running oscillator is located on the device and not externally syn-
chronized, it presents a minimal attack surface while exhibiting a strong correlation
with authentic GPS signals. We propose that ‘anomalies ’ in the correlation index
can authenticate received GPS data. Our approach is simple, fast and can perform
in near real-time. Additionally, the design is low cost and can act as an add-on to
virtually any GPS receiver.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 The GPS System
The GPS system consists of satellite transmitters and (usually) terrestrial receivers.
Each transmitter satellite broadcasts at two frequencies: 1575.42 MHz (L1) and
1227.6 MHz (L2). The L1 carrier messages are available for civilian purposes. These
messages are not encrypted but modulated with pseudo-random noise (PRN) codes
to distinguish each satellite. The L2 carrier is modulated by encrypted codes and re-
served for military purposes. Message from each GPS satellite contains information
about the position of the satellite and the time of the onboard atomic clock[67].
To calculate true receiver-to-satellite distance, the receiver requires the range
(rtrue) of a satellite at a given time. This can be calculated by the multiplying the
signal propagation time (from the transmitter to the receiver) with the speed of
light (c). Then, for a receiver located in (xr, yr, zr) and a transmitter at (xt, yt, zt)
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position, the range is given as:
rtrue = c tpropagation =
√
(xt − xr)2 + (yt − yr)2 + (zt − zr)2 (5.1)
To solve equation 5.1 for (xr, yr, zr), one requires ephemerides for three satel-
lites. However, since the clock on the GPS transmitter (tGPS) and the clock on
the receiver (tlocal) are not perfectly synchronized, there exists an offset tr between
these two time-scales. Therefore, the satellite-to-receiver distance that a receiver
perceives is a pseudo-range (rpseudo), where:
rpseudo = rtrue − ctr (5.2)
Therefore, a GPS receiver needs to solve for four unknowns (xr, yr, zr, tr) for
precise location and perfect synchronization. At least four satellite data is required
for solving this system of equations. Using this solution, a GPS receiver updates
its position, and synchronizes its local clock frequently to tsync for keeping perfect
synchronization with the universal coordinated time (UTC) where:
tsync = tlocal + tr (5.3)
In practice, this method provides accuracy in the order of 10 meters in position
and nearly 0.1µs in time [68]. As a result, GPS signals can be used not only for




Attacks on the GPS signal are usually performed by an adversary by either jamming
or spoofing one or both radio channels. For the jamming attack, an adversary
transmits overwhelming radio interference over the L1 and/or L2 band. For spoofing
attacks, the adversary mimics real GNSS transmissions to intentionally alter data
received by a victim receiver. Since civilian GPS signals are not encrypted and the
structure of the signal is well known, spoofing attacks are relatively straightforward
to execute using a commercial signal generator and RF transmitter.
5.2.3 Existing Spoofing Detection Techniques
As discussed in Section 5.1, signal-level detection methods can take on several forms
including (1) check/validate the received RF signal strength against a level thresh-
old, (2) compare L1 and L2 carrier signals, (3) justify the directional characteristics
and polarization of the received signal [64]. The strength of a received GPS signal
is typically less than -150dBW and presence of substantially stronger signals for a
single satellite or over the entire frequency band can be a sign of attack in progress.
However, it is possible for a spoofing attacker to adjust power levels to evade de-
tection limiting the usefulness of the threshold detection mechanism in practice[64].
Furthermore, most consumer grade receivers only support a single RF band, and
therefore, comparing L1, and L2 carriers would require complete replacement of the
internal RF-circuitry. Also, in a case of a replay attack, an attacker can delay both
L1 and L2 signals to avoid detection. Finally, using directional characteristics of
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the receiver antenna to cross-validate received signals from each satellite requires
specialized phase tracking hardware to detect directional variations. Similarly, sig-
nal polarization characteristics have been shown to be an effective authentication
aid [62]. However, dedicated receiver front ends and signal processing is required to
implement the approach efficiently.
Data-level spoofing detection uses demodulated GPS data to detect spoofing.
GPS data can be validated with known position data or otherwise obtained time to
detect attacks[69]. For example, a stationary receiver can check its known position
with the position-solution of the receiver. Since trilateration position error can be
±10 meters, the position solution is a weak measure of credibility. It has been
recently demonstrated by Jiang et al. [66] that attackers can use this uncertainty
to induce a phase angle error of 52 degrees in a PMU receiver by using simple
optimization based evasion algorithms. Monitoring jumps in the time reported by
the GPS signals is another possible GPS spoofing countermeasure. One can deploy
accurate clocks to measure time deviation between the reported GPS clock and the
onboard clock. However, precise clocks (such as atomic clocks etc.) are expensive
and not used in practice for commercial purposes. For IoT components, one can also
compare the GPS time with networked time protocols such as NTP. However, the
approach can suffer when the network is down. Moreover, the resolution of attack
detection is limited by the accuracy of the networked clocks.
While it is likely that signal threshold based authentication will be integrated
into commercial GPS receivers used for critical applications, the solutions discussed
in this section are currently cost prohibitive for consumer grade GPS receivers in
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the nascent IoT infrastructure. Hence, we propose a low-cost, computation and
power-budget friendly data-level GPS spoofing detection mechanism in Section 5.3.
5.3 Approach
The key idea of this work is to authenticate GPS time signals using intrinsic proper-
ties of a hardware oscillator. This would essentially construct a spoofing detector for
the signal. This spoofing detector will calculate frequency states of this hardware
clock using the received GPS signal as a reference. Any attacks on the received GPS
data will create anomalies in the internal frequency states of this clock. Once an
attack is detected, the design will attempt to generate an approximated version of
the correct GPS time tGPS to holdover the timing system during an attack. This
design would require two additional resources in addition to the GPS receiver:
1. a single (or multiple) free running oscillator(s),
2. additional data processing capabilities.
The architecture of the authentication system is shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Design of the secure GPS receiver with onboard authentication and
spoofing detection mechanism. The receiver is equipped with a single (or multiple)
free running temperature controlled oscillator(s). Kalman filter-based state estima-
tion is used for calculating frequency states of this clock. In the case of multiple
clocks, time from each free-running oscillator can be used for generating a low noise
stable virtual clock. Anomalies in the frequency drift and offset of this single clock
(or the low noise virtual clock) calculated with respect to the GPS signal can reveal
spoofing attacks on GPS signal. Updated filter parameters can help to reconstruct
the approximated true time-offset during a spoofing attack.
Our approach depends on the internal frequency states (i.e., frequency drifts
and skew) of a hardware oscillator for spoofing detection. Hence, we provide details
on hardware clock models in the next section to elucidate this approach.
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5.3.1 Hardware Clocks
Clocks and oscillators in embedded systems are primarily used for time-keeping and
synchronization purposes. In the majority of the embedded systems, crystal-based
real-time clocks (RTCs) are used for precise time-keeping. These RTCs are far
from perfect, and they deviate from ideal time due to both systematic and random
variations. These systematic variations arise from the imperfections in the physical
realization of the clock, and they are observed as time and frequency offsets and
frequency drift.
For avoiding ambiguity in the rest of the chapter, we reiterate the clock related
definitions from Moon et al. [70].
Clock: A clock is a piecewise continuous function that is twice differentiable. If
x(t) is the time reported by a clock at time t, there exists x′(t) = dx(t)/dt and
x′′(t) = d2x(t)/dt2 for t ≥ 0.
Offset: Offset is the difference between the time reported by two clocks. If time at
two clocks x1 and x2 are x1(t) and x2(t) respectively, then the offset of the clock x1
relative to clock x2 at time t ≥ 0 is x1(t)− x2(t).
Frequency: The rate at which the clock progresses. The frequency of x1 at time t
is x′1(t).
Skew: Clock skew is the difference between the clock frequencies of two clocks. The
skew of x1 relative to x2 at time t is y = x
′
1(t)− x′2(t).




At a given time t, the deviation of a clock from ideal time can be expressed as
[71]:
x(t) = x0 + y0t+
1
2
Dt2 + ε(t) (5.4)
where x0, y0 and D represents the time offset, frequency offset (also known as skew)
and frequency drift. ε(t) represents non-deterministic random deviations. The fre-
quency offsets and drifts of an RTC arise from the microscopic variations in the
crystal used in these oscillators. The frequency offsets and drifts also vary with the
dissimilarity in design, power supply, and environmental factors. These properties
have been found to be different for similar oscillators working in a same operating
condition. Therefore, we have the following assumptions regarding the frequency
states of hardware clocks:
A1. Frequency drifts and skew of a clock with respect to a more precise reference
are nearly constant and unique for a clock reference pair for a given duration.
A2. The states of a known free-running local oscillator, are predictable for a given
reference, and one can detect unusual activity in the reference by looking at
the properties of the local oscillator.
A3. These properties vary uniquely for different clock pairs due to the random
variations in their fabrication and are impossible to recreate without tampering
the hardware of both the clocks.
Based on our assumption, the GPS induced internal states of a given free run-
ning oscillator are relatively constant, and therefore, can be used to detect spoofing
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attacks. This is the key concept for our approach. It should be noted that Khono et
al. [72] first proposed the idea of remote device fingerprinting using the uniqueness
of frequency offset of hardware clocks. Since the publication of Khono’s work [72],
there has been a significant development in this field of remote device fingerprinting
using hardware oscillators. Our assumptions can be validated by Khono’s work,
the subsequent works in the literature and our experimental results and analysis
presented in this work.
5.3.2 State-Space Model of Hardware Clocks
For precisely calculating hardware clock states, we use a stochastic model of the
clocks where a clock-state is characterized by a column vector x(t) = [x1(t) y1(t)D1(t)]
T .
Here, x1(t), y1(t) and D1(t) represents the time offset state, frequency offset state
and frequency drift state respectively. The clock state follows the stochastic differ-
ence equations as given in [73]:
dx1
dt
= y1 + w1;
dy1
dt




where, wi(t) represents the associated zero mean white noise with spectral densities
qi. For an ensemble of q clocks the state vector can be written as [x1, y1, D1 . . . xq, yq, Dq]
T .
Discrete-time equations for a system described by 5.5 can be written as [73]:
Xn = FnXn−1 + Wn (5.6)
Ξn = HnXn + Vn (5.7)
where, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . corresponds to discrete time tn and measuring time
interval ∆ = tn − tn−1.
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For a single clock measurement, the Xn = [x1, y1, D1]
T represents the state
vector, and Ξn denotes the observation vector. Fn is the state transition matrix







The process noise Wn is considered to be zero mean additive white noise with






































This state model for a clock ensemble is amenable to the design of optimal
stochastic filters, which are broadly used for minimizing variance within a clock
ensemble. In this work, we use this state space model for hardware oscillators and
use an optimal filter (Kalman Formulation) to estimate these states for a single
oscillator[73]. It should be noted that if there are more than one on-board free
running oscillators available, one could create a virtual time reference using an
ensemble of clocks offering improved detection thresholds for spoofing attacks.
5.3.3 Kalman Filter Design for Authentication and Spoofing Detec-
tion
We use discrete time state-model for developing a Kalman filter based spoofing
detector. For our single clock experiment, we have the measurement matrix Hn =
117
Figure 5.2: Clock offset between two GPS clock measured with respect to a precise
rubidium clock.
Figure 5.3: Clock offset between two TCXO and a MEMS clock measured with
respect to a precise rubidium clock.
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[1, 0, 0]. Vn represents the zero mean measurement noise with covariance R. For
local measurements, we set R = 0 to neglect the noise term. The algorithm for this
linear Kalman filter [74] is given by the following equations:
Prediction Step:
mn|n−1 = Fnmn−1|n−1 (5.10)
Pn|n−1 = FnPn−1|n−1F
T








mn|n = mn|n−1 + Kn(Ξn −Hnmn|n−1) (5.13)
Pn|n = Pn|n−1 −KnHnPn|n−1 (5.14)
Here mn|n, Pn|n are the Gaussian posterior mean and covariance at n
th time-
step, and Kn is the Kalman gain at that step. The clock states at n
th time-step is
given by the components of mn|n, since mn|n is the learned estimate of time offset,
frequency offset and drift at that step. For our simulations, we assume the Gaussian
posterior mean at the beginning is zero and the initial posterior covariance is I3×3.
5.3.4 Signal Authentication and Anomaly Detection
Spoofing attacks induce variations in the GPS reference signal ranging from discrete
step changes to slowly evolving changes in the demodulated GPS data. Our anomaly
detection strategy classifies changes in the time offset, frequency drift, and frequency
offset measurements in the received GPS data in relation to the hardware oscillator
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Figure 5.4: Example time offset, frequency offset and frequency drift for a crystal
oscillator with respect to a stable GPS clock.
as anomalous when Xn lies outside the confidence interval of its predicted value
mn|n−1 ± Sn−1, where,
Sn−1 = HnPn|n−1H
T
n + R (5.15)
is the predicted variance of the offset. This approach can be used for detecting
simpler attacks inducing a step change in the time offset. This technique depends
only on a single data point and an estimate, and therefore, leads to a large number
of false positives. Moreover, an advanced attacker will self-consistently change the
offset to avoid such detection.
A better approach is to use a windowed strategy that takes account of a
number of recent measurements and find out the likelihood of a new measurement
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and estimate. For this approach, we calculate











where, i ∈ Z+ for a 3×1 Gaussian posterior mean, k is the window size, σ2i,n−1 is the
variance and m̄i,n−1 is the mean of the predicted values inside the window (n − 1)
to (n− k). By calculating a moving average of the log-likelihood zn, we can detect
an anomalous event when zn crosses a predefined threshold. Here,
zi,n = αzi,n−1 + (1− α) ln(p(mi,n)) (5.17)
with α as the smoothing factor.
5.4 Experimental Setup and Results
For our experiments, we use a commercial GPS receiver and temperature-compensated
crystal oscillators (TCXOs) to build an ensemble of free-running hardware oscilla-
tors. We use this design to validate the assumptions and formulation presented in
Section 5.3. The measurement infrastructure is comprised of an ARM microprocessor-
based data acquisition system with on-board data storage. Since this is a data-level
spoofing detection technique, we inject attacks by altering the GPS time-offsets of
the received GPS data and detect the attacks by using the free-running TCXO clock
offsets measured with respect to this spoofed GPS data.
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Figure 5.5: Data collection and instrumentation setup for the experiments presented
in this work. The instruments are (from top to bottom): a PTP transparent clock,
two GPS receivers, and a Rubidium clock.
5.4.1 Adversary Model
The major goal of the adversary is to produce erroneous time or position measure-
ments in the GPS receiver. We assume that the adversary has complete access to
the RF channel during the attack, i.e., he can replay, alter and/or replicate the RF
carrier, spreading code and data bits of any or all of the visible satellites. We can
divide the attacks in two categories:
1. Temporal-shift injection
2. Meaconing and replay attack
A temporal-shift injection attack changes the time and/or the position bits in
the GPS signal, which is reflected a sudden jump in the perceived time/location of
the victim. A meaconing and replay attack first induces the receiver to lock onto
its spoofed signal by transmitting code, phase, and Doppler-matched signals with
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gradually increasing power, and then drags off the code and phase carrier in such
a way that he avoids a discontinuous step change in time or the location estimates
of the victim receiver. We assume that the adversary is time-bound, i.e., he has a
limited time to spoof the receiver.
5.4.2 Attack Example and Spoofing Detection
To demonstrate the proposed spoofing detection approach, first we consider an at-
tacker performs a temporal shift injection attack on a GPS system. A temporal shift
injection is initiated at 5000 seconds represented by a sudden jump in the offset as
shown in Figure 5.6. During the attack, the attacker keeps maintains the temporal
shift. When tha attack ends, there is a sudden jump in the time offset which is
represents the recovery of the authentic signal by the receiver.
123
Figure 5.6: Example of a temporal shift injection attack.(a) Clock offset of a free
running TCXO with respect to a GPS reference. A temporal shift injection attack is
initiated at 5000 seconds. There a sudden jump in the time offset which is corrected
at the end of the attack; (b) Estimation of the frequency offset of the local clock with
respect to the spoofed GPS signal during before and after the attack. (c) Similar
estimation of frequency drift.
Detecting temporal shift injection in clock frequency domain is straightfor-
ward as one can notice the sudden overshoot in the estimated frequency offset and
frequency drift. Therefore, simple jump detection techniques can be employed for
discovering such attacks.
For the meaconing and replay attack we assume that an attack scenario on a
trained Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) as described in [75]. The attack involves
the deployment of a simulated gradually increasing delay on GPS signals, which re-
sults in an anomalous exaggeration of signal transmission time, and in turn, induces
an offset error in the GPS receiver. This attack described by the authors has been
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used by other experimental evaluations of fault detection algorithms and provides a
well-documented baseline to study the effectiveness of our proposed approach. Fig-
ure 5.7(a) illustrates the evolution of the attack starting at 5130 seconds causing





















































































































































Figure 5.7: Example of a replay and meaconing attack. (a) Clock offset of a free
running TCXO with respect to a GPS reference. A spoofing attack is initiated at
5130 seconds. The estimated time offset faithfully follows the spoofed signal as there
is no sudden jump in the time offset;(b) Estimation of the frequency offset (black
curve) and the averaged log-likelihood of the frequency offset(red curve) of the local
clock with respect to the spoofed GPS signal during before and after the attack.
The initial start-up and transition period for foffset and the log-likelihood is shown
in the inset. (c) Similar estimation of frequency drift (black curve) and the averaged
log-likelihood of the frequency drift (red curve) of the local oscillator. The window
size (k) for this computation is 128 data points.
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To detect the attack, we modeled the TCXOs using the stochastic model
presented in Section 5.3. Existing time offset based data level detection techniques
can only detect spoofing if there is a discontinuous change in time, caused by a step
change in the GPS reference. However, in this attack, the time is delayed slowly
making the attack mostly undetectable. Since the process noise measurements of
our TCXO were unknown, we used empirical values based on prior literature on
clock jitter q1 = 10
−3, q2 = 10
−6, q3 = 10
−9. We then design a state space model and
use the Kalman filter formulation to detect anomalies in the received GPS signal.
From Figure 5.7, we can see that if we use the simultaneous negative values
of averaged log-likelihood of frequency drift and offset as an indication of spoofing
attack, the detector can detect the first anomaly at 5752s, (about 10 minutes after
the start of the attack). Note that in this particular experiment the spoofing attack
was discovered when the cumulative error on the local clock was less than 4µs. This
is a relatively small error for some GPS-dependent systems.
5.5 Analysis
5.5.1 Accuracy
The accuracy of the proposed detection technique depends on the noise margin and
stability of the hardware clocks. For our experiments, we have used inexpensive
temperature controlled crystal oscillators (TCXOs), which provides a degree of im-
munity to temperature variations. One can use an ensemble of hardware oscillators
to create a virtual clock using the system of equations as discussed in section 5.3.1
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to reduce this noise. It should be noted that the accuracy and robustness of our de-
tection mechanism requires a prior estimate of the measurement noise Q. Without
any prior estimate, for example, if we set the spectral densities q1, q2 and q3 to 1,
then this technique detects the attack at 5811 and 5813 seconds and reports a false
positive at 3183 seconds.
Moreover, the detection mechanism is dependent on the window size (k) that
provides a historical moving average. Larger windows provide better estimates;
however, larger window size requires more memory and longer start-up time. For
the experiment shown in Figure 5.7, k = 8 gives a false alarm rate of 66% which
reduces to 20% for k = 16 and 0% for k = 32% and higher. Furthermore, there
is a transient period during startup for the Kalman filter (as shown in the insets
of Figure 5.7(b) and (c)) which requires a finite wait period before a consistent
estimation of the log-likelihood. Therefore, the weakness of this proposed approach
is the start-up period before effective detection is possible. For the example attack
provided in this work, it takes about 600 seconds for system start-up.
5.5.2 Computation Cost
The cost of matrix-vector computations for a Kalman filter in the prediction and
update step contains computation in the order of O(D2), O(MD), and O(M3) com-
plexity. The covariance matrices are symmetric, and therefore, Cholesky factoriza-
tion can be used for maintaining P in a square-root form. Since the prediction and
update step requires the knowledge of only current and previous steps, this construc-
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tion has a very low memory complexity. The anomaly detection step has logarithmic









The averaging window has a fixed memory requirement which can be lowered by
reducing the number of historical data points.
5.5.3 Hardware Overhead
GPS receivers already contain a hardware oscillator which is synchronized using
the GPS signals. By turning off the synchronization, it may be possible to convert
this clock to a free running oscillator. The synchronization based timing corrections
can be performed in software. Another approach is to add a hardware component
with embedded free running oscillators to employ the proposed method without
altering the GPS receiver design. The computation can be performed using onboard
processors in IoT devices or by adding a low power microcontroller that takes GPS
derived time as an input and provides the corrected time and spoofing detection
capability to the system.
5.5.4 Power Constraints for IoT
It should be noted that using this spoofing detection technique for IoT devices may
significantly increase the device’s power consumption due to the need for continuous
monitoring of the GPS signal. To save power by turning off monitoring periodically,
the detector should compute the current frequency states as quickly as possible.
Since there is a start-up time for this approach to detect spoofing, one can store
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the historical values for the Gaussian mean and variance along with the noise mea-
surements to reduce the startup time. For low power GPS receivers, if the receiver
is in sleep mode and starts with a spoofed GPS data from an attacker, then this
detection technique may be ineffective due to convergence transients during startup.
5.5.5 Signal Recovery
This detection technique has a-priori knowledge of the correct clock states, and one
can calculate an approximated value of the true time offset using the historical clock
states. For example, to recover from the example spoofing attack, once the attack is
detected, the approximately correct value of the time offset can be calculated with
the Gaussian posterior mean (mn|n−1) and the historical mean of the predicted
values m̄n,n−1 using:




m2,n|n = m̄2,n−1 (5.19)
m3,n|n = m̄3,n−1 (5.20)
and then using m1,n|n as the approximate value of the true time offset at a time step
n.
5.5.6 Hardware Intrinsic Security
Our approach does not depend on networked components for synchronization or
attack detection. The hardware oscillator(s), as well as the computational and
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Figure 5.8: Corrected offset using the recovery algorithm for temporal shift injection
attack. The correction approach can provide a semi-accurate clock reference during
an attack. The accuracy can be improved by using multiple clock sources.
Figure 5.9: Corrected offset using the recovery algorithm for meaconing attack. The
correction approach can provide a semi-accurate clock reference during an attack.
The accuracy can be improved by using multiple clock sources.
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measurement components, are located on the receiver and algorithm updates may
be introduced using existing firmware update infrastructure. Since dependency on
other networked components can make the system vulnerable to network attacks,
the proposed method provides better security and reliability.
5.5.7 Tamper Resistant Design
Tampering with the on-board clock(s) would detectably affect and change the clock
frequency states. As the changes are hardware dependent and unique, the design is
inherently tamper-resistant.
5.5.8 Comparison with Existing Approaches
As discussed earlier in this chapter, attack detection via comparison of time-offset
between the GPS-clock and a local clock is not always reliable, and self-consistent
attacks can easily spoof such detection techniques. Furthermore, offset comparison
requires time from a single local clock to be synchronized with a trusted clock
periodically to keep the readings accurate. As a result, current spoofing detection
solutions in the literature on comparing time with a known entity requires a notion
of trust to a third party time provider. To avoid these shortcomings, our proposed
design measures the clock states of a hardware oscillator with respect to the GPS-
time to verify the authenticity of the GPS signal.
It should be noted that commercially available low-cost GPS receivers do not
use any of the countermeasures described in the previous section [64]. Most of
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the measures are only implemented as prototypes in the lab environment where
software-defined radio platforms are used in most of the tracking, analysis, and
detection approaches. Implementation cost for practical deployment of these pro-
totypes significantly limits their widespread use. The spoofing detection method
presented in this chapter does not require additional RF circuitry or antennas and
uses low-cost TCXOs and data analysis to detect attacks. Furthermore, since our
approach is a data-level detection mechanism, no change to the receiver architecture
is required to integrate our countermeasure as an add-on to existing systems.
5.6 Conclusions
In this work, we present a design for integrating data-level spoofing detection with
an existing GPS-based timing system. The design uses single (or multiple) free
running oscillators to detect anomalies in the GPS-derived frequency drift and the
offset. We demonstrate that this approach can provide fast and accurate detection
of GPS spoofing attacks published in the literature. Since GPS spoofing attacks
pose a significant threat to IoT systems, including spoofing detection methods such
as the method presented in this chapter in future GPS receiver designs will secure
future navigation hardware for IoT application.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future work
In this dissertation, we have demonstrated several novel ways of lightweight authen-
tication using hardware dependent techniques. As the IoT space becomes larger,
new and efficient security protocols will be required to support a wide, distributed
low-power networks. Novel methods ensuring security and privacy will be necessary,
as well as existing cryptographic techniques needs to be revisited for this purpose.
From a hardware engineering point of view– when power and area budget becomes
crucial, techniques similar to the ones discussed in this work will be cost effective
and energy efficient. We envision many implications and possible future direction
of this work.
6.1 Improved Authentication Mechanism using LPN
From the two simple authentication protocols presented in chapter 3, it is evident
that memristive hardware can assist simple authentication and secure key storage
facilitates. To harness this potential, we present a learning parity in the presence
of noise (LPN)-based authentication scheme that is provably secure against passive
attacks. This scheme is derived from the Hopper and Blum(HB) authentication pro-
tocol that provides simple yet efficient authentication from hard learning problems
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[76, 77]. For this design, we will assume the assumption R5 of section 3.2 holds for
the memristor crossbar used in the authentication, (i.e., a memristor can be put into
a non-recoverable high resistive state using high current flow through the device.)
Theorem 6.1: The physical state (describing whether a memristor can be
written) performs a logical AND operation on the bit written to the memristor.
Proof: Assume the physical state describing whether the memristor can be
written is denoted by y (i.e., y = 1 meaning there will be successful state change
if the data to be written is 1, y = 0 means there will not be a state change and
the memristor will stay at NRHRS). The existence of nor-recoverable high resistive
state ensures that there will be memristors with y = 0. Then, if the incoming bit is
represented by x and the actual value stored after the WRITE operation is z, one
can draw the truth table as shown in Table 6.1
Table 6.1: Truth table describing the relation between the memristive state and the
data stored
x y z





From the truth table, it is evident that, z = x ∧ y.
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6.1.1 Description of a LPN-Based Authentication Protocol
Let us denote this protocol as Protocol III as this is a successor of Protocol I and II
of chapter 3. The protocol uses a memristive crossbar M of size ` × n. The secret
X ∈ Z`×n2 for authentication is distributed using Algorithm 8. For authentication,
multiple round of interactive authentication (as presented in table 6.2) is performed.
Assumptions: Assume R5 in 3.2 holds for the memristors used in the au-
thentication.
Algorithm 8 Key Generation and Storage in Memristive Crossbar for LPN based
Authentication





5: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `} do
6: for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
7: if X[i][j] = 0 then, RESET M [i][j] to NRHRS.
Enrollment: The verifier saves X for later authentication, the prover keeps the
crossbar M .
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— e ∈ {0, 1‖Prob[e = 1] = τ}
— Write R in M using the follow-
ing scheme:
If R[i][j]=0, RESET M [i][j];
else SET M [i][j]
— Read back the corrupted value
C from M using the following
scheme:
If M [i][j]=HRS, C[i][j] = 0
else C[i][j] = 1
z := e⊕ hdp(C,0`×n)
z−→
P = 〈R ◦X〉
If z = hdp(P,0`×n) accept
The authentication is performed in t rounds. The verifier finally accepts the
prover if the response of the prover was wrong for fewer than tτ times.
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6.1.2 Security Analysis
Let us assume that an attacker (A) tries to learn the secret X by eavesdropping
(R, z) over multiple rounds. Then it can be shown that this learning problem for
the attacker can be reduced to a learning parity with the presence of noise (LPN)
problem.
Definition 6.2 (LPN Problem) Assume τ ∈ R is a constant noise parameter
where 0 < τ < 0.5, t ∈ N is the number of samples, e is a random binary vector
such that e
$← {x ∈ Zt2 : wt(x) ≤ τt} and s be a `-bit binary vector (i.e., s
$← Z`2).
Given a random binary matrix R
$← Zt×`2 , and z = 〈R, s〉 ⊕ e, find an `-bit vector
x′ such that wt(〈R,x′〉 ⊕ z) ≤ τt.
LPN is an NP-hard problem [78]. The LPN problem is also known as the
Syndrome decoding problem that tries to find the closest vector to a random linear
error-correcting code, which is believed to be exponentially hard[79]. For τ > 0,
the BKI algorithm described in [80] gives a subexponential time algorithm that
solves the LPN problem in 2O(`/log`) time. Hopper and Blum first proposed a sim-
ple authentication protocol (HB) [76] using the LPN problem. The authentication
protocol described in table 6.2 can be derived from the HB protocol.
Theorem 6.3 Assume r = vec(R) denotes vectorization operation that gen-
erates a vector r ∈ Z2 of a matrix R. Then, the hdp() calculation by the prover P
returns the parity of 〈r, s〉 where r = vec(R), s = vec(S), R is the random challenge
sent by the verifier and S is the matrix representing the writabilty of each memristor
in the crossbar (i.e., if S[i][j] = 0,M [i][j] is at NRHRS).
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Proof: From Theorem 6.2, we can see that, after a writing operation the mem-
ory crossbar contains the corrupted value C which is equal to the binary Hadamard
product of R and the physical state (S) of the crossbar (i.e., C = 〈R ◦ S〉). Then,
if we consider c = vec(C),
∑
i c[i] mod 2 will be equal to the inner product of r and
s (i.e.,
∑
i c[i] mod 2 = 〈r, s〉). Since hdp(C,0) defines the parity of the Hamming
distance between C and 0, it effectively calculates the parity of the Hamming weight
of c which is equal to
∑
i c[i] mod 2. Therefore, hdp(C,0) = 〈r, s〉.
From theorem 6.3 it is evident that XORing an error e to the response of
the prover (hdp(C,0)), one can construct an LPN problem with the shared secret
S representing the physical state matrix of a memristive crossbar as shown in the
authentication protocol at table 6.2 .
This protocol is provably secure against passive attackers. However, it can be
shown that the protocol is insecure against active attackers and man-in-the-middle
(MIM) attacks. So, we improved the protocol in a similar fashion proposed at [77].
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Table 6.3: Single round interactive authentication for protocol III+




— e ∈ {0, 1‖Prob[e = 1] = τ}
— R
$← Z`×n2
— Y = Qv ⊕V
— Write R in M using the follow-
ing scheme:
If R[i][j]=0, RESET M [i][j];
else SET M [i][j]
— Write Y in M
— Read back the corrupted value
C from M using the following
scheme:
If M [i][j]=HRS, C[i][j] = 0
else C[i][j] = 1
z := Qz ⊕ e⊕ hdp(C,0`×n)
(z,R)−−−→
Y′ = Qv ⊕V
P = 〈R ◦ 〈X ◦Y′〉〉
If z = Qz ⊕ hdp(P,0`×n) accept
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6.2 Efficient Memristive Hardware Design and Fabrication
The authentication scheme discussed in the previous section uses an ` × n 1T1M
memristive crossbarM . The key-storing process described by the procedureKeySto3(X)
puts the memristive element M [i][j] to non-recoverable high resistive state (NRHRS)
for X[i][j] = 0. This operation makes later LPN-based computation simpler to
achieve with the memristive hardware.
The calculation for the hdp() function can easily be supported using finite
state machine built with a D-flip-flop, a two input AND gate and a two input XOR
gate. From our observation on the effect of variation in simple memristor based
security hardware, we recognize the opportunities in the following areas for future
research.
1. Novel circuit designs are required for reducing the supply voltage noise across
a memristor used in security hardware. Although memory applications can
sustain the effect of noise variations and operate reliability due to the simple
binary operation, security application that wants to harness the unique prop-
erties (such as nonlinearity, physical variability, etc.) of these novel devices
memristor to evaluate their designs reliability with variation.
2. New simple error correction techniques need to be developed to fight pre-
dictable environmental and operational variations.
3. Novel algorithmic techniques and supporting hardware are required for devel-
oping better state read-out and copy operation of memristive devices used for
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device security.
Furthermore, we have fabricated and characterized memristive hardware for
the experimentation purposes. We find that fabricating reliable and cycle accu-
rate memristive hardware requires extensive processing and fabrication techniques.
Hence, future research on the optimized fabrication is required to reduce the cost of
memristive hardware.
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Figure 6.1: Additional driver circuits required for efficient READ-WRITE operation
[7]. Sub-figure (a) shows how SET and RESET lines are controlled for setting and
resetting the memristor, R represents the line resistance for the SET and RESET
line; (b) and (c) represents the SET and RESET line driver designs required for
controlling the memristors in the crossbars; (d) shows a how read operation is per-
formed using the driver circuits; and (e) represents the sensing circuit required for
readout.
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Figure 6.2: Fabricated memristor and its dimensions. The top (light colored) and
bottom (dark colored) electrode are seen as the gray crossbars. The width of the
top and bottom crossbars are 2µm on average. In between the top and bottom
crossbars, a thin film of HfOx is deposited using atomic layer deposition.
Figure 6.3: Sample I-V curve for the fabricated memristor. Multiple read-write
cycle of the memristor is provided. The violet, sky-blue and red lines represent a
LRS to HRS transition when the voltage across a memristor at a low resistive state
is varied from +4 to -4V. The green, yellow and dark-blue lines represent a HRS
to LRS transition when the voltage across a memristor at a high resistive state is
varied from -4 to +4V.
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6.3 Application of Visual Cryptography in Physical Layer Group Key
Agreement Protocols
This dissertation has demonstrated the importance of simple yet secure crypto-
graphic protocols that can take advantage of physical properties. Such can also be
applicable to key distribution and key agreement protocols that uses physical nature
of the physical layer. For example, Jain et al. [81] have recently developed physical
layer group key agreement protocols on a controller area network (CAN) bus that
uses the capability of the CAN bus to calculate logical AND over the bus. In this
section, we show that the techniques presented in this thesis can be applicable in
such physical designs.
In this section, we develop the application of visual cryptographic schemes in
secure key storage for physical layer group key agreement protocols on a controller
area network (CAN) bus. For this application, we have modified the group key
agreement schemes of Plug and Secure (PnS) protocol described by Jain et al. [81].
We have observed that the intrinsic properties of a CAN bus provide the opportunity
to apply Visual Cryptographic (VC) primitives quickly and this can be helpful in
secure key storage for secrets generated using PnS protocols.
6.3.1 Problem Definition
Assume N users join in a PnS protocol to generate a L-bit secret K. After the
protocol finishes, each user will successfully generate K and use it for future com-
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munications within the group. However, compromising one node in a group will
reveal the shared key to an attacker, especially if the key is being stored for a longer
period. Therefore, a solution is required for distributed key storage which will (1)
provide security against attacks on nodes (2) provide fast regeneration of the keys
when required.
6.3.2 Solution
To solve this key storage problem, we use the constructs of visual cryptography.
First, let’s consider a toy example. Assume the case where authenticated nodes A
and B are in a group, and they share a b-bit secret K. Now, for longer storage of K,
A and B decide to generate a new key Kn using the following algorithm:
For the ith bit in K
1. If the bit is 0, A and B calculate the output of the hash function h(K, i). If
the output has an even parity then both of them save ”0” in the 2ith and ”1”
in the (2i+ 1)th place in Kn and if the output has an odd parity then both of
them save ”1” in the 2ith and ”0” in the (2i+ 1)th place in Kn.
2. If the bit is 1, A and B calculate the output of the hash function h(K, i). If the
output has an even parity then A saves ”0” in the 2ith and ”1”in the (2i+ 1)th
place in Kn and B save ”1” in the 2ith and ”0” in the (2i+ 1)th place in Kn in
its key. When it results in odd parity, A and B invert their roles.
Now, for an adversary attacking any one of the nodes, it is impossible to get
the secret K looking at the key stored in either A or B.
145
To regenerate the secret, all A and B has to do is put their stored keys simul-
taneously on the CAN bus. Due to the intrinsic wired-AND operation on the CAN
bus, the secret can be reconstructed easily. For each adjacent pair of bits on the
CAN bus, if they are ”00”, then the corresponding secret bit is reconstructed as 1,
and if they are ”01” or ”10”, the corresponding secret is reconstructed as 0.
The problem associated with this solution is that an eavesdropper can also
easily deduce the secret by looking at the CAN bus. To prevent such attacks, A
and B can store same inverting mask that inverts the bits for some (ideally half of
the) bit positions in secret. XORing with a common masking string dedicated to
the group can easily accomplish the task.
Based on this discussion above, we provide a detailed description of expanding
this scheme to a 2-out-of-n scheme, where n-ECUs shares the secret string K and
at least 2-ECUs are required for successfully regenerate the secret. We define two
Boolean matrices B0 and B1, and C0 and C1 is the set of all the matrices generated
by permuting the columns of B0 and B1. Then, for n users we pick an integer m
such that (mm/2) ≥ n. We can consider a ground set Sof size m and all subsets of S
os size m
2
. We can design B0 as a n×m matrix with each row containing m/2 zeros
and m/2 ones. The ithrow of B1 corresponds to the i
th subset of S, i.e., if the jth
element belongs to theith subset then B1(i, j) = 1, otherwise, B1(i, j) = 0[21].
Then at each node, we can do the following. Every node is allocated one dis-
tinct row of B0 (lets denote the row with B0,n)and one distinct row of B1 (lets denote
the row with B1,n). For i
th bit position, the node calculates y = h(K, i) mod m.
Then if the ith bit is zero, it rotates B0,n y times and stores the m bits and if the i
th
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bit is one, it rotates B1,n y times and stores the corresponding m bits.
For example, consider the case where n=6. We can choose m=4 since (42) ≥ n.
Now consider a ground set G = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the subset of G containing two
elements are {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}
Then, B0 =

1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0




1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1

Using the similar construction, Naor and Shamir extended the case for a gen-
erating B0 and B1 for k-out-of-k scheme. For k nodes, let us consider a ground set
G consisting of k elements g1, g2, ....gk. We denote all subsets of G with even cardi-
nality as p1, p2, .., p2k−1 and odd cardinality is denoted by q1, q2, , q2k−1 . The resulting
Boolean metrics B0 and B1 will have dimensions k×2k−1. From [21], we can define,
B0[i, j] = 1iff gi ∈ pj and B1[i, j] = 1iff gi ∈ qj. Then using the same idea as before,
each node has each distinct row of B0 and B1 and uses a hash function to generate
the permuted representation for ith bit. A n-out-of-k scheme can also be generated
by extending this scheme as described by Naor and Shamir[21].
Thus we have demonstrated the use of VC for storing the PnS secret in a
way so that compromising some node would not reveal the secret to the adversary,
and the secret for group key authentication can be stored in the distributed nodes
without the requirement of a dealer dealing the secret shares beforehand.
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